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ABSTRACT 
 
THE PROBLEMS OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Thomas Noah 
Cristina Bicchieri 
This dissertation is a collection of three essays centered around outstanding fundamental 
problems in the field of moral psychology. These fundamental problems concern both 
metaphysical and methodological disagreements – namely, what is the subject-matter of 
moral psychology? And what are the methods for the investigation of that subject-
matter? The first chapter examines the problem of marking the domain of moral 
psychology by isolating its subject-matter and the various methodologies for 
investigating it. By building from a minimal core of shared agreement, researchers should 
be able to classify different branches of moral psychology by both subject-matter and 
method of investigation while being quietist about the correct methodology. This is turn 
allows for the construction of a taxonomy of moral psychological approaches that allows 
researchers to efficiently locate the direct source of disagreements. The second chapter 
examines Lawrence Kohlberg’s research program and identifies a particular assumption 
that guides that program while blocking further progress in the field. That assumption 
concerns the relation between normative theorizing and descriptive categorization, such 
that the explanations for why one moral theory is superior to another mirrors stages of 
moral development. By abandoning this assumption and other assumptions in its local 
vicinity, researchers could make progress without being bogged down in first-order 
normative disagreement. The third chapter looks to a recent debate concerning whether 
neuroscience is normatively significant. Against a standard interpretation of the debate 
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in Anglophone philosophy that the argument for the normative insignificance of 
neuroscience is sound, I argue that the critique is only partly successful and not for the 
reasons commonly recognized. Rather than object to the program of demonstrating the 
normative significance of neuroscience on normative grounds, we ought to object to the 
program on descriptive grounds.  Each chapter proceeds through arguments rooted in 
philosophical analysis and reflections on findings in the social and natural sciences – in 
particular, history, psychology, economics, sociology, anthropology, cognitive science, 
and neuroscience.  
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PREFACE 
 This is a collection of essays on moral psychology that critiques the 
domain and practice of moral psychology by providing an examination of 
outstanding problems in the field. The title is meant to call to mind Bertrand 
Russell’s famous The Problems of Philosophy. A relatively short collection, The 
Problems of Philosophy finds Russell working on a project wherein he tried to say 
something positive and constructive rather than merely negative about what he 
took to be some central problems in philosophy (Russell 2001).  From this aim, he 
largely confined himself to epistemological questions concerning knowledge 
rather than metaphysical questions concerning being. But although I mean to 
echo both the title and the aim of saying something positive and constructive, my 
collection of essays does not sidestep the issue of metaphysical disagreement but 
rather centers it. These essays are related less by unity of argumentation than by 
unity of concern. The concern is that persistent disagreement in moral 
psychology is bad for both theoretical and practical reasons.  
Theoretically, this kind of persistent disagreement is troubling but also to 
be expected if we accept a general Sellarsian outline that there is an issue of 
reconciling the manifest and scientific images of humanity (Sellars 1963). One 
way of capturing the basic Sellarsian idea is that we have representations of 
ourselves that are of two kinds: we appear as both persons who exist in the 
world and act on the basis of intentions and biological creatures with material 
constitutions that behave in a world of causes, and there is an tension between 
these two images inasmuch as each image does not easily lend itself translatable 
in the language of the other. If we accept this overall problematic, then it is 
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reasonable to expect that moral psychology is going to be of special interest as a 
domain of inquiry, as suggested by Sellars near the end of his essay: that we are 
persons with certain ethical standards which can conflict with desires (and, 
although Sellars does not say this, other kinds of preferences) and to which we 
may not conform must be reconciled with the scientific image of humanity and 
human behavior in order for the synoptic response to the problematic to succeed. 
Although this collection works in the wake of the Sellarsian problematic, 
in that a theme concerns coming up with a naturalistically plausible and 
acceptable account of moral psychology that can do justice to the two images, it 
is perhaps less optimistic about the proposal to cash out the synoptic vision 
through ultimately tendentious normative concepts of rights, duties, and 
community intentions. Rather, we start with the aim of showing that many of the 
disagreements in moral psychology are in fact not proper to the domain. Once 
we realize that, we can see some light toward resolution of local problems. The 
approach is piecemeal and does not propose to solve all the problems in one fell 
swoop. Rather, we must first diagnose the problems in order to make local 
improvements that do not rely on the tendentious antecedent normative 
commitments that drive counterproductive disagreement.  
But there are practical concerns as well. Philosophers have an obvious 
interest in the understanding of the nature, facts about, and possibilities of the 
human. Natural and social scientists, governments, NGOs, and other individual 
and institutional change agents have an obvious interest in understanding the 
causes of human behavior in order to change that behavior. While much work 
has been completed on the nature of narrowly self-interested, prudential, and 
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social norm-related behavior, the domain of moral behavior remains 
underdeveloped, at least compared to the relatively robust predictive success in 
the other domains in the typology. But we know that moral thinking and 
behavior exists. We know that it has profound and pervasive impacts on the 
world and the life prospects of human beings, especially on the life prospects of 
the least-advantaged persons. Persistent disagreement in moral psychology runs 
the risk of the development of a constellation of theories that, while empirically 
adequate relative to antecedent normative commitments, is empirically 
inadequate with respect to capturing all behavior that is not captured by, for 
example, rational choice and game-theoretic analysis. The moral, as such, is 
incalcitrant to such analyses, leaving only rival moral theories to provide 
guidance in theory choice.  
 In focusing on the nature of disagreement in the domain of moral 
psychology, I have come to the conclusion that much of the disagreement 
concerns issues that, in a certain sense, go beyond the realm of pure psychology. 
Or rather, the disagreement concerns disagreement, at least in part, over the right 
way to conduct psychological investigation of the moral. The other part, in my 
view, is fundamental disagreement about the nature of morality itself. Putting 
these points together, we can say that the field of moral psychology is riven with 
methodological and metaphysical disagreement, where “metaphysical” here 
picks out the nature, if any, of moral reality itself.  
 Here is a fundamental problem in the field of moral psychology: there is 
no accepted definition of “moral psychology.” That wouldn’t be too troubling if 
there were a more-or-less shared methodology or set of shared methodologies. 
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Unfortunately, there isn’t. But even if there were not a shared definition or more-
or-less shared methodology, moral psychology wouldn’t be that bad off if there 
were agreement about the subject-matter of moral psychology. But, again, there 
is not.  
 I believe that a plausible explanation of these facts – the facts of 
disagreement about the subject-matter, definition, and correct methodology of 
moral psychology— is that those investigating moral psychology deeply 
disagree about the correct account of morality (they disagree metaethically), 
about what would be the right or wrong thing to do in some particular 
circumstance (they disagree normatively), and about what kinds of explanations 
the moral psychologist should offer, in particular with respect to the role of 
intuition and theory in explanation (they disagree metaphilosophically). These 
disagreements are reflected in the nature of their moral psychologizing.  
 Because of such disagreements, moral psychology is a fractured discipline, 
if it is a unified discipline at all. The largest division, in my view, is between 
those working in what I call the humanistic and empirical traditions of moral 
psychology.  Roughly, the humanistic tradition makes use of a wide range of 
methods and evidential sources to come to particular and determinate claims 
about moral psychology. In particular, humanists accept as legitimate the 
methods of conceptual analysis, intuition pumping, and conceptual genealogy 
and are willing to accept a broad range of evidence, including appeals to 
philosophical moral theory, emotion, literature, history and the humanities. 
Empiricists, on the other hand, are restrictive with respect to both method and 
evidence; in particular, they tend toward accepting only the methods of the 
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successful natural and social sciences and only the evidence that would counts as 
“scientific evidence” within those domains.  
 The humanist and empiricist traditions split on many important problems 
relevant to the domain of moral psychology. Although not fully articulated and 
defended only lightly in the collection, there is a broader regulatory ideal of 
unifying (in principle) moral psychology by putting forward a method that each 
side – humanist and empiricist – could accept.  I call this research program 
Minimal Moral Psychology. By “minimal moral psychology,” I intend to pick out 
a method of interpretation that guarantees to eliminate as much of the 
disagreement as possible by deliberately limiting the amount and kind of 
metaethical, normative and metaphilosophical inputs allowed in moral 
psychology. This method is a method of ideal interpretation and consists of the 
application of two principles: 
Principle 1: Do not import distinctively moral content into psychological 
explanations if there are ready-to-hand non-moral psychological tools that 
can explain the phenomena. 
and 
Principle 2: “[I]dentify an excess of moral content in psychology by 
appealing first to what an experienced, honest, subtle, and unoptimistic 
interpreter might make of human behavior elsewhere” (Williams 1995).  
And, of course, trim the excess. 
Together, the principles, when understood properly and acted upon, help solve 
the problem of metaethical, normative and metaphilosophical disagreements 
driving moral psychological disagreement by calling upon the moral 
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psychologist to cull, if possible, the inputs driving the moral psychological 
disagreement. 
In this collection, I provide three essays that speak to the nature of this 
methodological and metaphysical disagreement and trying to offer something 
positive and constructive along the way by offering a way to categorize it, 
understand at least one of its historical origins, and resolve at least one kind of it. 
The first essay provides an understanding of the domain of moral 
psychology by attending specifically to certain instances of outstanding 
disagreements and using them to organize thought about the subject matter and 
definition of the subject. A background guiding principle is that our 
understanding of the domain of moral psychology should be generous and 
deflationary enough to capture all the parties in these particular disputes while 
also being able to separate moral psychology from, say, vision science or 
branches of social psychology simpliciter – that is, to say something cognitively 
significant while not also using particular tendentious claims to define away the 
opposition in these disputes. I argue that there is substantial disagreement about 
the definition, subject matter, correct methodology of moral psychology. Most of 
the disagreement is moral (normative), metaethical (or metanormative), and 
metaphilosophical. We can create a taxonomy of moral psychology along 
methodological divides. Moral, metaethical, and metaphilosophical 
disagreement drives much of the between-camp and within-camp disagreement -
- especially between those we can identify as "empiricists" and those as 
"humanists."  
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The second essay tracks a historical origin of at least one source of 
persistent disagreement in moral psychology. By focusing on the case of 
Lawrence Kohlberg, we can come to see more clearly the danger of tying 
particular descriptive accounts to particular normative accounts, and vice versa. 
Although many contemporary moral psychologists disavow various parts of his 
program or its results, it remains the case Kohlberg has exercised a large 
influence on the field of empirical moral psychology. In particular, Kohlberg 
assumes that the structures of descriptive moral psychology and normative 
ethical theorizing will be isomorphic. I argue that this assumption is optional for 
a moral psychologist. Further, because optional, moral psychologists have 
freedom to reasonably reject the assumption. Finally, because there also exist 
compelling metatheoretical considerations against the assumption, moral 
psychologists have at least some reason to consider an alternate paradigm of 
moral psychological research centered around the question of how much 
substantive moral content ought a researcher allow into their program. A 
background idea here is that moral psychology has become balkanized at least in 
part because various traditions have built up rival explanations out of the 
resources of their preferred normative theories. And given that each may be 
“empirically adequate” relative to the antecedent normative commitments at 
hand, no tradition has a reason to move from their accounts unless they also 
move from their normative commitments, which is unlikely for most 
practitioners. If we allow, though, as seems reasonable to me, that descriptive 
accounts can constrain normative commitments but that we ought to be wary of 
normative commitments constraining the descriptive accounts, then it would be 
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useful to identify normative commitments that are shared across rival traditions 
in order to assess the empirical adequacy of various descriptive accounts on 
offer. This is because, in the end, there is no way to do moral psychology but 
through partial grounding in moral theory. 
The third essay concerns the direct interactions between neuroscience, 
psychology, and normative ethics. One current area of dispute is whether 
neuroscientific data is normatively significant -- that is, whether we can draw 
normative conclusions from neuroscientific evidence. Selim Berker and other 
humanists working in the philosophical tradition argue that we cannot, while 
Joshua Greene and other empiricists working in the neuroscientific and social 
scientific traditions have argued that we can. I argue that both sides are partly 
right and partly wrong. Neuroscientific evidence can serve as partial grounding 
for normative conclusions in mixed arguments with both normative and 
empirical premises, contra Berker. However, we should not think, as Greene and 
others think, that any such arguments will eliminate or select potential 
candidates for universal morality systems. The debunking will be local -- 
neuroscientific evidence cannot show us that we ought to be classical utilitarians. 
This has important implications for research in both the empirical and normative 
domains. Empiricists should not think that they can defeat their normative rivals 
merely by means of brain data, but normativists should not think that empirical 
considerations are wholly irrelevant to figuring out how one ought to live. I 
allow, in the end, the high-level normative principles often offered as principles 
of right action may, in principle, be immune to empirical evidence, but mid-level 
principles must be responsive in order to satisfy a minimal notion of action-
xxii 
 
guidance that the overwhelming majority of ethical theories accept as a 
constraint on adequate ethical theorizing.   
This collection of essays attempts to harmonize conceptual analysis, 
thought experiments, social and natural scientific data to a degree that is 
respectable in each relative mode of inquiry. 
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DISAGREEMENT ABOUT THE DOMAIN OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
1 Introduction  
 
 The title of this chapter is “Disagreement about the Domain of Moral 
Psychology,” and the first conclusion of this chapter is that the domain of moral 
psychology is the structure of moral cognition. As such, moral psychology seeks to 
provide, in part or in whole, an explanation of the structure or some aspect of the 
structure of moral cognition. There are many aspects of the structure of moral 
cognition: the psychological and neurophysiological underpinnings of moral and 
ethical beliefs, judgments, choices, emotions, preferences, motivations, attitudes, 
and behaviors; the contents of moral and ethical beliefs, judgments, choices, 
emotions, preferences, motivations, and attitudes; the relations between 
underpinnings, the relations between contents, and the relations between 
underpinnings and contents; the relations between the underpinnings and 
contents of moral cognition and other types of cognition, such as rational choice 
or social cognition; the presuppositions of different kinds of moral or ethical 
thinking; the role of the environment in shaping the individual/group and the 
individual/group shaping the environment; and the evolution and history of the 
structure of moral cognition. Any work that seeks to provide, in part or in whole, 
an explanation of the structure of moral cognition of some aspect of the structure 
of moral cognition counts as a work of moral psychology, according to this view. 
 The second conclusion of this chapter is that given that we accept the 
above account of the domain of moral psychology, we should accept a taxonomy 
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of moral psychology that divides categories along methodological lines. There is 
no methodology or set of methodologies that is shared by all of those 
investigating the structure of moral cognition. Dividing by methodology allows 
us to easily identify methodological disagreement. However, within a particular 
methodology, there is still substantial disagreement. This within-camp 
disagreement is largely normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical. We can 
think of each node in the taxonomy as wrapped in normative, metaethical and 
metaphilosophical layers. Alternatively, we can think of the taxonomy itself as 
wrapped in normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical layers. Regardless, 
normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical disagreement occurs at each node 
in the taxonomy and explains much within-camp disagreement. Because the 
normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical disagreement of interest is largely 
a within-camp phenomenon, it’s useful to have a taxonomy that divides along 
methodological lines.  
 The two conclusions resolve two outstanding problems in the field of 
moral psychology: first, “what is the subject matter and definition of moral 
psychology?,” and second, “what are the methods someone could use to examine 
the subject matter of moral psychology?” Since resolving these two outstanding 
problems is important for the field of moral psychology, the two conclusions are 
important for the field of moral psychology. 
 This paper leaves to the side the question, “Which are the good or right or 
most useful methods or set of methods someone could use to examine the subject 
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matter of moral psychology?” It also leaves to the side the question, “Assuming 
that there is some correct methodology, how do we come to know about it?”  
 The order of the paper is as follows: first, I will review some literature that 
suggests that there is disagreement about the definition and subject matter of 
moral psychology. I will then offer a fuller treatment of my view that the domain 
of moral psychology is the structure of moral cognition and that moral 
psychology seeks to provide, in part or in whole, an explanation of the structure 
or some aspect of the structure of moral cognition. I then provide a sketch of a 
taxonomy based upon different methods someone could use to explain the 
aspects of the structure of moral cognition. I explain the taxonomy and argue 
that it is useful for diagnosing between-camp and within-camp disputes. At the 
same time, there are some moral psychologists who have mixed methodologies 
or who occupy more than one camp at a time. The methodological taxonomy can 
also explain how their work differs from closely related work that does not cross 
camps.  
2 What is the subject matter and definition of moral psychology?  
 
 One of the major problems in moral psychology is that there is deep 
disagreement about what counts as 'moral psychology.' The aim of this section is 
to say what counts as ‘moral psychology’ by describing the domain of moral 
psychology and then defining “moral psychology” in such a way that it offers 
explanations of target phenomena in the domain of moral psychology. 
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2.1 Revision of Original Method 
 
 In a previous version of this paper that I presented as a talk to the 
Dissertation Seminar at the University of Pennsylvania, I contrasted two ways of 
defining “moral psychology.” One way to divide the sheep from the goats (moral 
psychology from something else) is to begin with a top-down definition of 
"moral psychology." Call this "Fiat Method." An alternative strategy is to observe 
what people who claim to do moral psychology actually do and to theorize about 
the relations between these different practices. Call this "Geographical Method." 
These methods roughly correspond to the difference between conceptual-
analytic and social practice accounts of a particular domain of inquiry. I argued 
that the Geographical Method was a better way of defining “moral psychology” 
because I thought the method was less tendentious and less open to 
disagreement than the Fiat Method. I also thought the Geographical Method was 
useful inasmuch as it points our attention toward the actual practices of people 
who claim to do moral psychology, and such facts, I claimed, were pretty 
important in thinking about moral psychology. 
 This distinction between these two methods is ultimately futile, although 
there is something important that the distinction aims to capture. What is 
ultimately futile about the distinction is that the Geographical Method is, at 
bottom, itself a Fiat Method, inasmuch as all strategies for definition rely upon 
operationalization of terms. All definitions are “top-down” in this sense, and 
there is no meaningful distinction between Fiat and Geographical Methods in 
how I previously described the methods. That said, there is an important 
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difference between defining “moral psychology” in terms of one’s preferred 
approach to moral psychology and defining “moral psychology” in terms of 
practices related to the domain of moral psychology. The former is too exclusive, 
depending on what one’s preferred approach to moral psychology is.1 But the 
latter doesn’t strike me as too exclusive or inclusive: it hits a Goldilocks standard 
in terms of scope by limiting the account to observable behavior and practice. 
 That said, my original formulation was incomplete and open to 
misunderstandings. In the original formulation, I attempted to sidestep the issue 
of specifying the target domain of moral psychology. I thought that I could 
sidestep the issue since I could identify the target domain downstream; in 
particular, I thought that by appealing to the practices of people who claim to do 
moral psychology, I could then, from those practices, identify the subject-matter 
of moral psychology and that such identification would be protected from 
standard objections to domain specification. I was wrong.  
 There are a couple of objections that arise in response to a proposal like 
that of my original approach, and most of these objections are rooted in the fact 
that such an approach doesn’t specify individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for membership that would exclude prima facie absurdities. 
So, even though objections based on rhetorical questions such as, “Is my bowling 
                                                             
1 For me to define “moral psychology” in terms of my preferred approach to 
moral psychology would make me almost certainly have to rule out many 
practices that I had wanted to call “moral psychology.” 
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ball moral psychology?” are, strictly speaking, non-sequiturs,2 there are related 
issues. Namely, my previous account, the one not tied to a subject-matter, didn’t 
suitably restrict moral psychology because it allowed that moral psychology is (i) 
what people who claim to do morally psychology actually do and (ii) the 
relations between those practices. But, moral psychologists do lots of things – 
they brush their teeth, they listen to trap music, they study chemistry, and so on. 
So it is insufficient to say that moral psychology is what people who claim to do 
moral psychology actually do, for people who claim to do moral psychology 
actually brush their teeth, but no one thinks that brushing your teeth is moral 
psychology.3 
 Because of this, I have come to realize that I must say something about the 
subject-matter of moral psychology in order to fruitfully address the question, 
“what is moral psychology?” We need to restrict the range of activities that 
moral psychologists actually do that are relevant for picking out moral 
psychology as a field. We could try the strategy of saying that moral psychology 
is the stuff people who claim to do moral psychology do when they claim to do 
moral psychology. This again allows objections from deviant cases and 
                                                             
2 Because the point was never “moral psychology is whatever people who claim 
to do moral psychology claim to be.” Basically, the “bowling ball objection” only 
would work on the condition that my account was meant to say, “if a person 
who claims to do moral psychology claims to be some X, then moral psychology 
is also that X,” and if it were true that there were some individual who both 
claimed to do moral psychology and to be a bowling ball. I assume such a person 
doesn’t exist. The point was “moral psychology is whatever people who claim to 
do moral psychology actually do.”  
3 I owe part of this line of questioning to Daniel J. Singer and Andrew McAninch.  
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absurdities.4 I see no way to avoid these objections but to specify the domain and 
subject matter of moral psychology. Importantly, though, this doesn’t mean that 
I’ve given up on all of the original approach. Rather, we must integrate the 
practices of people who claim to do moral psychology with an account of the 
domain and subject matter of moral psychology into our definition of “moral 
psychology,” and we’ll have to do so in a more or less holistic way, even though 
the subject-matter of moral psychology is given some explanatory priority in 
marking out what counts as moral psychology. 
2.2 Popular Conceptions of Moral Psychology 
 
 What is the subject matter and definition of moral psychology? 
Thankfully, like many questions of this sort, we do not have to start at the barest 
of philosophical intuitions and work our way up or deduce our way down from 
there. Instead, there is a history of practices aimed at providing explanations in 
the target domain of moral psychology. And sometimes the practitioners have 
provided definitions of moral psychology that we can now evaluate. In what is to 
follow, I will present a series of definitions of moral psychology that have 
popped up among those aiming at providing explanations in the target domain 
of moral psychology. This series is not exhaustive, but it is meant to illustrate 
                                                             
4 For example, we could have a deviant case where a person claim to do moral 
psychology performs some behavior and calls that behavior moral psychology, 
but we simply wouldn’t want to say that it’s moral psychology. But the deviant 
who claims to do moral psychology and claims that snapping his fingers 13 times 
before leaving the room counts as “moral psychology” isn’t doing moral 
psychology. He’s doing some other, bizarre thing.  
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important continuities and discontinuities between rival conceptions of moral 
psychology.  
 In the introduction to their collection Moral Psychology: Historical and 
Contemporary Readings (2010), Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias and Shaun 
Nichols write: 
Moral psychology is the field that addresses these and related issues – it is 
the study of the way humans think about morality, make moral 
judgments, and behave in moral situations. While the immediate goal of 
the field is to understand moral cognition and behavior, the inquiry also 
has possible implications for how we should make moral judgments and 
how we should behave. Even though we cannot move directly from data 
concerning how we actually do think and behave to theories about how 
we ought to think and behave, by exploring morality in an 
interdisciplinary way, moral psychologists are, at a minimum, able to 
place empirical constraints on normative theorizing. Moral psychology 
thus involves the intersection of philosophy and empirical sciences 
ranging from evolutionary biology and game theory to neuroscience and 
social psychology. (p. 1) 
“These issues” that moral psychology addresses as a field are  
What is it about human beings that enables (or compels) us to engage in 
such complicated moral thought and behavior [e.g., non-reciprocal 
altruism and moral debate]? What biological and psychological capacities 
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underlie our moral judgments? What drives us to help those in need? 
What enables us to follow moral norms and to be responsible for 
transgressing them? (p. 1) 
Nadelhoffer, Nahmias and Nichols capture important features of moral 
psychology in their definition, even if we may wonder about some of their 
particular details of their account.5 Taken in a suitably broad way, it is 
undeniably true that moral psychology has the subject matter of “the way 
humans think about morality, make moral judgments, and behave in moral 
situations.” A complaint about this way of talking is that it is far too coarse-
grained to be informative beyond the obvious platitude that moral psychology is 
about morality and psychology (allowing that psychology is about thinking and 
behavior). But this complaint is lessened in view of the questions that moral 
psychology addresses as a field. To take one example, what is it about us human 
beings that enables or compels us to engage in moral debate? This is an example 
that begins to flesh out the subject matter of moral psychology in a way that says 
something non-trivial and important about moral psychology. We can 
investigate the question from cognitive scientific or sociological points of views, 
and what we have to investigate is a particular aspect of the structure of moral 
cognition. 
                                                             
5 For example, if moral psychology has “possible implications” for ethics and 
ethical theory, then the best they can say is that, at a minimum, moral 
psychologists only possibly are able to place empirical constraints on normative 
theorizing. And the claim that “moral psychology thus involves the intersection 
of philosophy and empirical sciences” doesn’t follow from “by exploring 
morality in an interdisciplinary way, moral psychologists are, at a minimum, 
able to place empirical constraints on normative theorizing.” But I set these 
issues to the side for the sake of discussion. 
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2.3 Three Fundamental Disagreements 
 
Disagreement 1: Is the interface of empirical psychology and normative ethics a topic in 
moral psychology? 
 Another important feature of Nadelhoffer, Nahmias and Nichols’s 
definition is that it incorporates normative ethical theorizing (or at least 
implications for normative ethical theorizing in the form of “constraints”) into 
the field of moral psychology. Another way to put the point is that, according to 
them, the interface of what we might call “empirical moral psychology” and 
normative ethical theorizing is itself part of the subject matter of moral 
psychology.  
 This view has support among other contemporary moral psychologists. 
So, for example, John Doris writes in the introduction to The Moral Psychology 
Handbook (2010) that for moral psychology, times lately have been both 
interesting and good: research at the intersection of human mentation and 
human morality is flourishing as never before” and that “the discipline of moral 
psychology is, as the name intimates, a hybrid inquiry, informed both by ethical 
theory and psychological fact” (p. 1). Or consider the account offered by Doris 
and Stephen Stich in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article “Moral 
Psychology: Empirical Approaches” (2017): 
Moral psychology investigates human functioning in moral contexts, and 
asks how these results may impact debate in ethical theory. This work is 
necessarily interdisciplinary, drawing on both the empirical resources of 
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the human sciences and the conceptual resources of philosophical ethics.” 
(par. 1). 
These all suggest that “moral psychology” is not (or not only) what contemporary 
psychologists in departments of psychology at universities do when working on 
explanations of the causal and computational structure of moral cognition. 
 But not all investigators agree that moral psychology includes the 
interface of empirical moral psychology and normative ethical theorizing. For 
example, Regina Rini (2015) argues that moral psychology is about the causal 
and computational structures of the human moral faculty.6 This suggests to me 
that she thinks that the interface of moral psychology and normative ethical 
theorizing is not itself part of moral psychology. This investigation of the 
interface would belong to a branch of philosophy, perhaps moral philosophy or 
metaphilosophy. And we can draw upon many examples of moral philosophers 
– from Kant (1998) to many contemporary Anglo-American or “analytic” 
philosophers – who think that empirically-oriented moral psychology (one of the 
two aspects of moral psychology in the Nadelhoffer, Nahmias, and Nichols and 
Doris, Doris and Stich lines) is largely or completely irrelevant to the practice of 
normative ethical theorizing. For example, Selim Berker (2009) argues in “The 
Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience” that  
                                                             
6 It is true that Rini qualifies her statements so that it is about “empirical moral 
psychology,” which leaves open the possibility that there is a non-empirical 
moral psychology. But, later in her article, she slides between empirical 
psychology and psychology when making her claims about the causal structure 
of the human moral faculty.  
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[E]ither attempts to derive normative implications from these 
neuroscientific results rely on a shoddy inference, or they appeal to 
substantive normative intuitions (usually about what sorts of features are 
or are not morally relevant) that render the neuroscientific results 
irrelevant to the overall argument. (p. 294) 
What is animating Berker’s position here is that the interface of empirical moral 
psychology – at least neuroscientific versions of empirical moral psychology – 
and normative ethical theorizing is a subject in philosophy and not in moral 
psychology.7 
 So we have disagreement between those investigating moral psychology. 
Some think that moral psychology includes the interface of empirical moral 
psychology and normative theorizing, and others disagree.  
Disagreement 2: Must moral psychology make use of the resources of philosophical 
ethics? 
 But this is not the only disagreement. Again, the 
Nadelhoffer/Nahmias/Nichols, Doris, and Doris/Stich accounts claim that 
moral psychology is an interdisciplinary field and that one of the relevant 
disciplines is philosophical ethics itself. But there are some people working on 
moral psychology who do not make use of the resources of philosophical ethics 
and who would typically eschew such resources. The reasons for avoiding the 
                                                             
7 I interpret this quote as saying that attempts to lay the groundwork for the 
interface fall prey to bad epistemological practice. The interface is a proper 
subject of logic, philosophy of science, and epistemology. The proper 
(philosophical) view is that there’s no such interface. 
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resources of philosophical ethics are varied: perhaps the resources aren’t 
vouchsafed in the right way, or perhaps the resources are not properly 
“empirical,” or perhaps the resources can’t be falsified or whatever the standard 
(and that the resources can’t be falsified or whatever constitutes an obstacle to 
making use of the resources).  
 For example, Cristina Bicchieri does work on what is recognizably 
“empirical moral psychology,” but she does not make use of the resources of 
philosophical ethics. Bicchieri’s theory of social norms is a system of 
classification of characteristic motivations of collective patterns of behavior (2006, 
2016). Using traditional concepts associated with game-theoretic analysis and 
rational choice theory (such as ‘preference’ and ‘belief,’ she distinguishes 
between customs, descriptive norms, social norms, and moral norms. According 
to Bicchieri, moral norms are a subset of personal norms, and personal norms are 
marked by an unconditional preference to act in accord with the norm.8 This is in 
contrast to unilateral and multilateral descriptive norms and social norms, where 
the preference to act in accordance with the norm is conditional on empirical 
expectations that relevant others act in accordance with the norm or conditional 
on empirical expectations plus normative expectations. Normative expectations 
are beliefs about other people’s beliefs about what you should or what should be 
done. Behavior in compliance with moral norms is grounded in personal 
normative belief, a first-order belief of the form “I think I/you/they/us should 
do X.”  
                                                             
8 Habits, customs and moral norms are all instances of personal norms, according 
to Bicchieri’s 2006 account. 
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 Bicchieri’s 2006 treatment of moral norms and moral norm compliance is 
the least developed treatment of any of the collective patterns of behavior that 
she examines. But, in laying out her partial theory of moral norms, Bicchieri does 
not seem to call upon the resources of philosophical ethics. Now, it’s true that 
there is a tradition in philosophical ethics that maintains that moral norms issue 
unconditional demands, and there is a philosophical ethical tradition that says 
that when a person makes a moral judgment, then, ceteris paribus, that person is 
motivated to act on the judgment regardless of what she perceives others to think 
of her moral judgment. But Bicchieri makes the distinction between moral norms 
and, say, social norms not on the basis of philosophical ethics but rather on the 
basis of the belief/preference model from rational choice theory and the concept 
of interdependent choice from game theory. And there is no part of her account 
that implies the motivational internalism from the philosophical ethical tradition, 
as it remains possible (and in many cases of sufficient social pressure, likely) that 
individuals with not act in order with the moral belief that they happen to hold 
with respect to some behavioral rule. This is why, I think, this account has 
difficulty separating habits/customs from moral norms. So, for example, 
Bicchieri (2006) writes 
Condition 2 (the conditional preference condition) marks an important 
distinction between social and personal norms, whether they are habits or 
have moral force. Take the habit of brushing my teeth every morning. I 
find it sanitary, and I like the taste of mint toothpaste. Even if I came to 
realize that most people stopped brushing their teeth, I would continue to 
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do so, because I have independent reasons for doing it. It is likewise with 
moral norms: I have good, independent reasons to avoid killing people I 
deeply dislike. Even if I were to find myself in a Hobbesian state of nature, 
without rules or rights, I would still feel repugnance and anguish at the 
idea of taking a life. With this I do not mean to suggest that moral norms 
are a world apart from other rules. Instead, by their very nature, moral 
norms demand (at least in principle) an unconditional commitment. (20) 
Both habits and moral norms are motivated by unconditional commitments (that 
is, unconditional on what I expect others to do or believe), and we can express 
this fact by noting that habits and moral norms are each grounded in (good) 
independent reasons.9 Still, Bicchieri says that our motivational profile toward 
the collective behavior or rule of behavior determines whether we are dealing 
with moral norms or social norms, not our stereotypical justifications of the 
behavior that we would attempt to give. But most moral philosophers, especially 
working in the wake of 20th century metaethics that try to separate morality from 
other normative domains such as prudence or etiquette, and, although this is 
specuation, most ordinary non-philosophers explicitly avow that habits or 
                                                             
9 I think that there is a problem here with the introduction of “good” before 
“independent reasons to avoid killing people I deeply dislike.” It makes sense to 
say that I have good, independent reason to brush my teeth. Since I value my 
overall health, it is instrumentally rational and good for me to brush my teeth. 
But “good” doesn’t seem to function in the same way in the imagined moral case. 
It may not be instrumentally rational of me not to kill people I dislike in a 
Hobbesian environment. So I don’t know what Bicchieri means here. “Good” in 
the case of habit clearly picks out “good for me,” and in some sense over and 
above “good for me in the sense that I think the reasons are morally good.” 
People sometimes express that that have good moral reason to do such-and-such, 
even though doing such-and-such would be “bad” for them on all but the most 
ascetic readings of “bad for you.” 
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matters of prudence are different than moral norms, even though both demand 
“unconditional commitment” in the sense that Bicchieri employs the term.10 If 
Bicchieri were drawing upon the resources of philosophical ethics, then she 
should be able to cleanly separate habits from moral norms in line with the 
philosophical tradition and ordinary understanding. Therefore we can conclude 
that she is not drawing upon the resources of philosophical ethics.11  
 So far, we have two disputes about the subject matter and definition of 
moral psychology. First, some think that moral psychology includes the interface 
of empirical moral psychology and normative theorizing, and others disagree. 
Second, some think that moral psychology, perhaps regardless of interface 
issues, requires the conceptual resources of philosophical ethics, and other 
disagree. I want to turn now to one final point of dispute. 
Dispute 3: Should moral psychology be examined in an empirical or humanistic way?  
 This point of dispute is a growing issue, and I think that it highlights 
something important about moral psychology. Remember that we are examining 
accounts that maintain that moral psychology is a hybrid theory of ethical theory 
and psychological fact. The “psychological facts” here correspond to the facts as 
given by empirical investigations into moral thinking and behavior. But there are 
some people who think that there is a distinctly philosophical moral psychology that 
                                                             
10 Or at least our (moral philosophers’ and perhaps many of the folks’) concepts 
“habit” and “moral norm” are clearly different. 
11 Of course, this assumes that rational choice theories are not examples of 
philosophical ethics. I would be willing to consider treating the theories as 
ethical theories; in such a case, I would need an alternative example of my point 
here. 
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can be contrasted with empirical moral psychology, and they think that 
philosophical moral psychology is superior to much empirical moral psychology 
(or is a necessary supplement to empirical moral psychology in order to curb its 
excesses). The question here is whether moral psychology belongs to the 
empirical sciences. Some say yes, and others disagree. 
 A couple of examples here should suffice. Carla Bagnoli (2011) identifies 
the dispute between empirically-oriented moral psychology – of the sort 
practiced by Stich, Doris and other people who are members of or who are 
influenced by the Moral Psychology Research Group – and what I’ve called 
above “philosophical moral psychology. She writes: 
In contrast to this empirical approach to philosophy and psychology, 
others argue that both disciplines are autonomous with respect to the 
cognitive sciences. [Here she cites Bernard Williams and R. Jay Wallace as 
exemplars] Of course, empirical findings may be indirectly relevant to 
philosophical arguments. . . Even if they recognize that a dialogue with 
the empirical sciences is inevitable and rewarding, these philosophers 
argue that it is misleading to think of the activity of philosophy as 
modeled on the empirical sciences. At issue, then, is not science, but 
‘scientism’, [sic] or the philosophical view that assimilates philosophy to 
science and borrows its methods. (p 13) 
Bagnoli goes on to discuss how the issue turns on the issue of moral motivation 
and how many analyses of moral motivation depend, in part, on a priori methods 
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of analysis. We see this sort of issue pop up when moral philosophers talk about 
empirical treatments of, say, altruism and altruistic behavior. The empirical 
psychologist or philosopher offers some operationalized sense of “altruism” and 
“altruistic behavior” that is testable and allows for measurement. The moral 
philosopher says, “You’ve missed important part P of altruism (typically, a 
characteristic of the motivation). Your operationalization is bad, you’ve missed 
the target phenomena, and your results don’t show what you claim that the 
show.”  
 In order to demonstrate that this is a real phenomena, one could look at 
the vast literature comprising Humean, Kantian, Aristotelian, and Thomist 
theories of moral motivation and see how they rely upon a priori and normative 
methods that sharply distinguish the moral from the non-moral. For a particular 
case in point, we could look at Lawrence Blum’s criticisms of Shaun Nichols’s 
sentimental rules account of moral cognition. Blum (2011) lays out his complaints 
at length: 
I will argue that Nichols’s view suffers from several deficiencies: (1) It 
operates with an impoverished view of the altruistic emotions (empathy, 
sympathy, concern, compassion, etc.) as mere short-term, affective states 
of mind, lacking any essential connection to intentionality, perception, 
cognition, and expressiveness. (2) He fails to keep in focus the moral 
distinction between two very different kinds of emotional response to the 
distress and suffering of others – other-directed, altruistic emotions that 
have moral value, and self-directed emotional responses, such as personal 
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distress, that do not. (3) Nichols is correct to see morality as requiring 
affectivity, the capability of emotional response to others; but his incorrect 
view of altruistic emotions (and of emotions in general) leads him to 
misstate the connection between morality and emotion. (4) Nichols fails to 
recognize Schopenhauer’s form of anti-rationalism as distinct from 
Humean sentimentalism; some of his arguments presented to support the 
latter instead lend support to the former. (5) Finally, while agreeing that 
moral philosophy is strengthened by knowledge of empirical psychology, 
I suggest that the foregoing failures of Nichols’s argument are partly due 
to his misuse of particular empirical results and findings, his being over-
enamored of empirical psychology, and possibly to a weakened 
commitment to the distinctive contribution that the humanistic methods 
of philosophy make to our understanding of the moral enterprise. (p. 171) 
Blum’s disagreement with Nichols’s is as complete as I could wish for in an 
example, and Blum’s criticisms of Nichols perfectly encapsulate the divide 
between empirical and humanistic or philosophical modes of moral psychology. 
Blum argues that Nichols mischaracterizes altruism, that Nichols too readily 
relies on empirical rather than analytic accounts of altruistic motivation, that 
Nichols has a generally impoverished view of emotions due to ready reliance on 
empirical psychology, that Nichols fails to respect the history of philosophical 
theory (especially philosophical theory with respect to moral psychology, and 
that Nichols’s failures are related to his metaphilosophical attitudes. This is not 
to say that I endorse Blum’s criticisms, nor is it to say that I reject them. The 
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criticisms, as such, are orthogonal to the point that I’m trying to make. The point 
that I’m trying to make is that Blum and Nichols substantially disagree about the 
correct methodology and the role of the experimental method and empirical data 
in choosing between rival accounts in moral psychology. 
 So, to summarize, there is substantial disagreement about whether the 
interface of empirical moral psychology and normative ethical theorizing is a 
subject in moral psychology, there is disagreement about whether doing moral 
psychology requires taking on the conceptual resources of normative ethical 
theory, and there is disagreement about whether we should investigate moral 
psychology with the tools of experimental psychology, of traditional 
philosophical analysis, or of some combination thereof. These disagreements 
amount to disagreements about the subject matter, definition and methodology 
of moral psychology. If that’s true, then I think that we should look for an 
understanding of moral psychology that locates these disputes as within the field 
of moral psychology. 
3 The domain of moral psychology is the structure of moral cognition 
 
 As I said previously, I think that one way to get traction in thinking about 
the definition is to think about the domain of moral psychology. I’ve also said 
that the domain of moral psychology is the structure of moral cognition. And 
I’ve said that the structure of moral cognition has the following aspects: the 
psychological and neurophysiological underpinnings of moral and ethical 
beliefs, judgments, choices, emotions, preferences, motivations, attitudes, and 
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behaviors; the contents of moral and ethical beliefs, judgments, choices, 
emotions, preferences, motivations, and attitudes; the relations between 
underpinnings, the relations between contents, and the relations between 
underpinnings and contents; the relations between the underpinnings and 
contents of moral cognition and other types of cognition, such as rational choice 
or social cognition; the presuppositions of different kinds of moral or ethical 
thinking; the role of the environment in shaping the moral and ethical beliefs of 
the individual/group and the individual/group, from those moral and ethical 
beliefs, shaping the environment; and the evolution and history of the structure 
of moral cognition. 
 This understanding of the domain of moral psychology is, I believe, 
consistent with what how the people I’ve talked about so far think about the 
domain of moral psychology. Granted, I have specified the domain in greater 
detail than merely talking about moral thinking and more behavior. I have 
broken down “thinking” into components like “beliefs,” “judgments,” “choices,” 
“emotions,” “preferences,” “motivations,” and “attitudes.” I have separated the 
discussion of the cognitive and neurophysiological underpinnings of these acts 
of moral thinking from their contents, and I’ve deliberately left “underpinnings” 
and “contents” open so as to be able to capture substantive disputes about what 
counts as an “underpinning” or as a “content.” My characterization of the 
structure of moral cognition is in principle consistent with both sides of the three 
disagreements that I’ve listed before as fundamental disagreements. The 
structure of moral cognition is the target phenomena that researchers in moral 
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psychology are after, and many of the people listed above have some substantial 
disagreement about some aspect of the structure of moral cognition. So, for 
example, debates about where to locate the interface of empirical moral 
psychology and normative ethical theorizing take different aspects of the 
structure of moral cognition as salient and then advance substantive positions 
about those aspects. The salient aspect, for one theorist, could be the relation 
between the underpinnings and the contents of moral psychology; for another, it 
could be about merely the contents of moral psychology. It doesn’t really matter 
for our purposes whether we think that the interface is a subject in empirical 
moral psychology or normative ethical theorizing – if it’s part of empirical moral 
psychology, then it’s a part of the structure of moral cognition, and if it’s part of 
normative ethical theorizing, then it’s also a part of the structure of moral 
cognition (in virtue of the fact that moral psychology seeks to explain the 
contents of particular moral judgments as well as specifying the casual and 
computational structure of the human moral faculty). 
 If this characterization of the structure of moral cognition has a “heads, I 
win, and tails, you lose” quality to it, do keep in mind that the characterization 
rules out a lot as possibly being the subject matter of moral psychology. Set 
theory is not part of the subject matter of moral psychology nor is non-organic 
chemistry nor is brushing your teeth nor is social norm theory, except inasmuch 
as these items can become the content of particular moral judgments. There is a 
universe of not-moral psychology. With that said, it’s not an objection to my 
account of the structure of moral cognition that lots of people talking about 
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moral psychology are doing moral psychology when they do the sorts of things I 
was describing them as doing. It’s a feature, and not a bug, of the system that 
those I’ve mentioned before are all doing moral psychology. 
4 The Definition and a Taxonomy of Moral Psychology 
 
 But, from this first approximation as to the structure of moral cognition, 
we get a principled way to define “moral psychology.” The definition is that 
moral psychology seeks to provide, in part or in whole, an explanation of the 
structure or some aspect of the structure of moral cognition. This definition is 
principled because we have defined a target class of phenomena that is of 
cognitive significance. We want to know about those aspects of the structure of 
moral cognition, and moral psychology is the field that attempts to provide 
partial or complete explanations of aspects of or all of the structure of moral 
cognition. If you are not trying to provide partial or complete explanations of 
aspects of or all of the structure of moral cognition, then you are not doing moral 
psychology. Alternatively, we do not call you a “moral psychologist.” 
 From the definition of “moral psychology,” we could devise a taxonomy 
that breaks down according to which aspect or aspects of the structure of moral 
cognition that the theorist is trying to explain. I think that this results in a 
needlessly complicated schema, and the needless complication gets in the way of 
any true utility that the schema could provide. Rather, all that we need for the 
purpose of categorization are methodologies. We assume in the taxonomy that 
we have already antecedently addressed which aspect of the structure of moral 
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cognition we want to investigate. Then, we can ask, “What are the methodologies 
that we could use to investigate this subject matter.” Here is where attention to 
the practices of extant moral psychology because useful again. Although 
explanatory priority is given to the structure of moral cognition, we cannot 
ignore the practices of moral psychology if we wish to diagnose primary areas of 
dispute. We can provide a methodological division according to different styles 
of explanation, assuming that there are multiple styles and that causal 
explanations are not the only sorts of explanation. Then, within a methodological 
division, we can identify within-camp disagreement by invoking substantive 
normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical positions. I want to diagnose 
primary points of methodological and substantive dispute, and any 
representation that allows such a diagnosis and that is clear and perspicuous is 
acceptable from my perspective.  
5 The Methodological Taxonomy 
 
 Given that moral psychology is the field that seeks to provide, in part or in 
whole, an explanation of the structure or some aspect of the structure of moral 
cognition, then it makes sense to distinguish among kinds of moral psychology 
by the characteristic types of explanation that the kinds would give. 
 In my taxonomic sketch, we can distinguish between humanistic, 
empirical and theological types of explanation. I’ve already gone part way 
toward distinguishing between humanistic and empirical types of explanation. 
Empirical types of explanation rely upon the scientific method generally and the 
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methods of the successful natural and social science more specifically to provide 
explanations of whatever aspect of the structure of moral cognition is under 
consider. Many people grant that the aspect of the structure of moral cognition 
concerning the psychological and neurophysiological underpinnings of aspects 
of moral thinking and behavior either require or are enhanced by means of 
empirical explanations.12 
 But some people don’t grant that theological explanations count as 
genuine explanations, or they don’t grant that theological explanations are 
autonomous from humanistic explanations more generally. To the first, I reply 
that positing a moral sense implanted by a deity is a potential explanation. It’s 
not a very good explanation, but, if it were true that a deity implanted a moral 
sense in humans, then you could potentially explain some aspects of the 
structure of moral cognition in terms of your proposed theology. To the second, I 
reply that humanistic explanations are different in kind from theological 
explanations. Let me explain by talking more about what I think constitute 
humanistic explanations. 
 I think that humanistic explanation come in three primary modes: 
normative, phenomenological and historical/genealogical. These methods try to 
explain aspects of the structure of moral cognition, but they don’t do so through 
the methods of the successful natural and social sciences or through the methods 
peculiar to particular theological commitments. Humanistic modes of 
                                                             
12 The neurophysiological must be carried out in empirical fashion. There is no 
humanistic or theological tradition of explanation that even begins to account for 
such underpinnings. 
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explanation are pitched at the level of interpretations of the human being as 
beings in the natural world. There is a fundamental explanatory difference 
between positing a faculty of pure practical reason (which would count as 
“humanistic” under my schema) and positing a moral analogue of a sensus 
divinitatis (which obviously would count as “theological”).13 
 Under the humanistic tradition, which I’ve previously identified with 
Blum and which Bagnoli identified with Williams, Wallace and the Humean, 
Kantian, Aristotelian and Scholastic theories of moral motivation, we can identify 
people who are attempting to explain aspects of the structure of moral cognition 
by reference to explicit normative theories (“normative”), by reference to the 
phenomenology of lived moral experience (“philosophical” and “literary” 
versions – the distinction here is a genre distinction, but it’s also related to the 
explicitly articulated phenomenological theory), and by reference to historical-
genealogical accounts that seek to vindicate or deflate confidence in held belief 
[for example, (Nietzsche 1989), (Foucault 1977) and Williams’s (2002) on the 
multifarious uses of genealogical method).  
 Against the theological and humanistic traditions, we identify the 
empirical tradition, and we subdivide according to the venerable distinction in 
the philosophy of social science between methodological individualism, holism 
and mixed approaches. Individualist approaches seek to explain collective 
patterns of behavior by reducing the phenomena to patterns of interlocking 
individual behavior within certain boundary constraints. Holist approaches seek 
                                                             
13 I thank Devin Curry for this point. 
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to explain individual behavior in terms of social entities, institutions, or 
phenomena that are in some sense more than the aggregate of individual choice. 
Mixed methods mix and match according to the particular subject matter. 
 What is useful about this taxonomy is that it allows us to identify points of 
dispute between, say, Thomists, Blum and Nichols. We can say that they are all 
doing moral psychology, but they disagree with respect to method. 
 Importantly, the schema also allows us to identify when people are 
mixing methods. So, for example, Duke Naturalists make simultaneous use of 
historical-genealogical and empirical methods. We can track that Wong (2009) 
and others are doing this, and we can separate them from folks who are merely 
doing one or the other style of explanation. Or, for another example, many 
Christian moral psychologists of late antiquity combined literary, historical-
genealogical, and theological methods {for example, see (Augustine 1998). Again, 
the schema tells us about possible methodologies; it doesn’t tell us which 
methodology is right or which methods are the good or reliable or useful 
methods. I will say that I think that it is a function of one’s normative, 
metaethical and metaphilosophical commitments whether one is likely to mix 
and match methodology, although I will not explicitly argue for that here. It is 
enough to say that mixed methodologies don’t need any special place within the 
taxonomy, for we have all the components necessary for explaining in what ways 
a particular mixed methodology happens to be mixed.  
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 But still, there is within-camp disagreement that is also important to 
account for. The rings or layers of normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical 
commitment allow us to do just that. We can identify points of within-camp 
dispute – such as the dispute between Joshua Greene (2008) and John Mikhail 
(2008) at the level of individualist empirical moral psychology – as largely arising 
out of normative and metaethical disagreement. They disagree, for example, 
about whether it would be right to push the fat man in the bridge version of the 
trolley problem. They also disagree about what the correct account of morality is 
more generally. But they mostly agree on the correct methodology for the 
investigation of the psychological and neurophysiological underpinnings of 
moral thinking – they are both using the methods of cognitive science. 
 To add some further content to the bare sketch: John Doris (2002) and 
Gilbert Harman (1999) argue that social psychological research shows that there 
are no robust character traits as assumed and required by contemporary virtue 
ethical theories, Sharon Street (2006) argues that Darwinian evolution 
undermines claims that our psychology is adapted to perceive robustly mind-
independent moral facts, and Joshua Greene and many others (2001) argue that 
there is compelling psychological and neuroscientific evidence that 
characteristically utilitarian judgments are reason-based (in some interesting 
way) while characteristically deontological and virtue ethical judgments are 
emotion-based (in some interesting way). 
 Of course, there are others working at the same level in the taxonomy and 
who dispute these claims. So, Rachana Kamtekar (2004), Daniel Russell (2009), 
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Nancy Snow (2010) and many others argue that Doris and Harman’s complaints 
are overblown and that character traits have respectable scientific credentials and 
that social psychology is consistent with normative virtue ethics. David Copp 
(2008) and others have argued that Darwinian evolution poses no problem for 
their versions of naturalistic moral realism. And John Mikhail (2011), Fiery 
Cushman (2013) and others have argued that characteristically deontological 
judgments are wholly or partly constituted by cognitive appraisals.  
 These disputes are largely normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical. 
Our taxonomy should allow space for these disagreements and account for them. 
This is not a full account of the ways in which normative, metaethical and 
metaphilosophical commitments drive within-camp moral psychological 
disagreement, but it is an introduction. Fuller articulation of this view will 
depend on the fuller articulation of a method of separating normative and non-
normative content so that we can be in a position to reliably identify points of 
normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical dispute. However, we have a 
general sense of what we’re up to, and I see no in principle objection to this line 
of inquiry. 
6 Conclusion 
 
 I have offered an account of the domain of moral psychology that 
identifies it as the structure of moral cognition. I spent quite a deal of time 
explaining how there is disagreement about the definition of “moral 
psychology.” I argued that the identification of the domain of moral psychology 
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with the structure of moral cognition was principled and consistent with 
prevailing attitudes. I then argued that the identification gives us a principled 
basis for defining moral psychology as the field that seeks to provide, in part or 
in whole, an explanation of the structure or some aspect of the structure of moral 
cognition. I then gave a very brief taxonomic sketch about alternative methods of 
explanation of aspects of the structure of moral cognition. 
 What we need to develop going forward is a more fully articulated 
account that shows how the methodological taxonomy interlocks the aspects of 
the structure of moral cognition such that certain aspects of the structure of 
moral cognition are more amenable to certain styles of explanation. For now, it 
suffices to say that I have specified the domain of moral psychology, provided a 
working definition for “moral psychology” on the basis of that domain 
specification, and presented a first-pass taxonomy of positions in moral 
psychology by dividing along methodological lines. Showing how the 
normative, metaethical and metaphilosophical layers work in the picture require 
more work and is outside the scope of the present discussion. 
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MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, NOT MORALIZED PSYCHOLOGY: REFLECTIONS 
ON KOHLBERG 
 
1 Introduction  
 
Our psychological theory as to why moral development is upward and 
sequential is broadly the same as our philosophical justification for claiming that a 
higher stage is more adequate or more moral than a lower stage. 
-Lawrence Kohlberg (1971)14 
 
The fit between the special psychological conception and the demands of 
morality enables us to see that this piece of psychology is itself a moral 
conception, and one that shares notably doubtful features of that particular 
morality itself. 
-Bernard Williams (1995a) 15 
   
 Lawrence Kohlberg jumpstarted the modern experimental turn in moral 
psychology.16 And, even though many empirically-oriented moral psychologists 
                                                             
14 P. 180-81. 
15 P. 74. 
16 I stress the “modern” here because there is an experimentalist tradition in moral 
psychology dating back to Aristotle and running through to Hume and the 
sentimentalist traditions, to Spencer and the evolutionary traditions, and to 
Dewey and the classical pragmatist tradition. In point of fact, Kohlberg thinks of 
himself as traveling in Dewey’s wake, armed with certain methods adapted from 
Piaget (1971, p. 154). But, given that Kohlberg’s work on morality is probably 
more read than Dewey’s at this point, I see nothing especially problematic about 
my ascription. Regardless, I take Kohlberg’s work – and his assumption about 
the relation of descriptive and normative practices in moral psychology – to be 
symptomatic of a larger trend. Given that Kohlberg still serves as a shared point of 
reference for those working in moral psychology, I hope that by starting with 
him we can recognize a strain of thinking that continues to today.  
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now believe that Kohlberg’s theory was wrong in one way or many, his influence 
stills extends throughout the community.17  
 One of his legacies, though, has been stronger than any other: Kohlberg 
was explicit that he was attempting to tether tightly an account of moral 
development and moral cognition to an account of moral epistemology and 
metaethics. What this meant for Kohlberg was that any adequate explanation of 
the psychological mechanisms that produce behavior identified as “moral” 
would be broadly the same as any adequate justification of certain principles or 
modes of reasoning as moral. Kohlberg (1971) provides some further clarification 
as to what counts as ‘broadly the same’: 
[W]e do hold a stronger position, claiming that while psychological theory 
and normative ethical theory are not reducible to each other, the two 
enterprises are isomorphic or parallel. In other words, an adequate 
psychological analysis of the structure of a moral judgment, and an 
                                                             
17 The initial impulse to write this paper came from a discussion in Cristina 
Bicchieri’s fall 2012 class at the University of Pennsylvania on moral psychology. 
Reflecting the interdisciplinary nature of the subject, the class drew students 
from philosophy, psychology, economics, political science, and history. During a 
week of studying Kohlberg and Gilligan’s work, there was a lively debate in class 
on the continued relevance of reading Kohlberg, with (roughly) the non-
philosophers arguing that Kohlberg should be ignored since he got the facts wrong 
and with the philosophers and historian responding that it is important to 
understand where the discipline came from, that there is a complicated relation 
between conceptual schemes and facts, and (in the case of one person) that there 
are no facts per se. My response was that we should read Kohlberg because, 
without being fully aware of it, we could inherit some of his conceptual baggage, 
and we might not want some of that conceptual baggage. This paper extends that 
point – what we as a discipline have inherited from Kohlberg is a rather odd idea 
about the relation between descriptive psychology and normative theorizing, 
that each is constrained by the other. And, I argue, we should not accept that.  
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adequate normative analysis of the judgment will be made in similar 
terms. In the context of our work, psychological description of moral 
stages corresponds to the “deep structure” of systems of normative ethics. 
The logical relations between stages represent indifferently the structure 
of an adequate theory of moral judgment development, or the structure of 
an adequate theory as to why one system of moral judgment is better than 
another. Thus, we have argued for a parallelism between a theory of 
psychological development and a formalistic moral theory on the ground 
that the formal psychological developmental criteria of differentiation and 
integration, of structural equilibrium, map into the formal moral criteria of 
prescriptiveness and universality. (p. 224) 
The particular details of Kohlberg’s account – related to differentiation, 
integration, prescriptivity, and universality – need not concern us at the moment. 
What is important to take from the passage is that, for Kohlberg, the logical 
structure of the true descriptive account is isomorphic or parallel to the logical 
structure of the right normative account,18 such that (i) each discourse contains 
                                                             
18 I apply “true” to the descriptive account and “right” to the normative account 
in order to emphasize that Kohlberg still accepts some minimal conception of the 
fact/value distinction, such that there are some instances of naturalistic fallacy 
(of course, none from his own theory, according to Kohlberg). Kohlberg tries to 
bridge the gap between the ‘true’ and the ‘right’ by means of a pragmatic 
standard of ‘adequacy.’ But, “adequacy” itself is an evaluative notion and a 
slippery one at that. “Adequate for what and to whom?” we should ask.  
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the same or “similar” terms19 and that (ii) descriptions of types of moral judgment 
directly map onto justifications of particular morality systems (and vice versa).20 
 In this paper, I will argue that Kohlberg’s assumption is deeply wrong. 
While I accept that findings in descriptive psychology should impact our 
commitments to particular normative theories, I do not accept that our particular 
normative theories should impact our commitment to accounts of descriptive 
psychology, at least not in the strong way he demands. 
 We should not accept the latter because it is possible to develop an 
account of moral psychology that is minimalist. By “minimalist,” I mean that it is 
possible to theorize about descriptive moral psychology without importing 
substantive and ultimately tendentious normative commitments. Since it is 
possible to do that, we are not forced to accept Kohlberg’s assumption. We can 
                                                             
19 Kohlberg in the passage quoted above on this page talks about “similar” terms 
but in other places (see the epigraph to this paper) talks about sameness. This 
terminological fuzziness places pressure on his claim that there is an 
“isomorphism” between psychological theory and normative ethical theory, for I 
take it to be sound to say that if X is similar to Y, then X and Y are different in at 
least one respect other than numerical identity (because if they were not different 
in at least one respect other than numerical identity, then they would be the same 
– speaking at the type rather than token level—and not similar). So, the similarity 
relation is not “edge-preserving,” so to speak. Still, we need not get too hung up 
on this point. For more, see (Goodman 1972). 
20 “Morality system” is a philosophical term of art from Bernard Williams, first 
developed in the late 1970s before fuller development in the 1980-90s. For our 
purposes, allow “morality system” to pick out theories of morality as developed 
by Western philosophers and theologians. Paradigmatic examples of the morality 
system includes divine command theory, consequentialism (including 
utilitarianism), deontology (including contractualism and contractarianism), and 
(in its ambitious and universalistic forms) neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. To be 
sure, these examples share common features that make them fall under the 
concept ‘morality system,’ but those features are orthogonal to my argument 
here. For more on Williams’s specific notion, see (1985). 
37 
 
then choose between accepting the assumption on the basis of pragmatic or 
meta-theoretical considerations. And there are two strong meta-theoretical 
considerations that weight against the assumption: namely, the incoherence of 
morality systems in general as a result of social and cultural evolutionary history 
and the extraordinary “lightness” of metaethical philosophizing. 
 The structure of the paper will be as follows: first, I will further explicate 
Kohlberg’s assumption – its motivations and its consequences – through a close 
philosophical reading of “From Is to Ought.” Next, I will argue that we should 
not accept the assumption, for reasons outlined above. Finally, I will conclude 
with some considerations about the relation between realism and naturalism in 
moral psychology, given a rejection of the assumption. A continued theme of this 
paper is that we need a moral psychology, not a moralized psychology. By this I 
mean to give slogan to the minimalist moral psychology partially described above. 
But, if moral psychology is just to be the psychology of moralizing or certain 
kinds of moralizing or the psychology of entertaining particular substantive 
normative commitments,21 then perhaps we would be better off without moral 
psychology as well.22  
2 The Assumption: Motivations 
 
                                                             
21 Such that “moral psychology” becomes a base kind of cognitive 
phenomenology, or what-it’s-like to think that P (where P is some substantive 
moral claim, like “justice is the supreme value” or “avoiding harm is the 
trumping obligation” or “it’s wrong to torture cats for fun”).  
22 I will not argue explicitly for this claim, but it will be implicit in much of the 
discussion to follow. 
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 It is important to note at the outset that Kohlberg’s assumption is, in fact, 
an assumption. There are two ways this is so: he does not provide an argument for 
the claim, and there are reasons the claim must be an assumption – there is no 
framework from which we can say, ex ante to the deliverances of his moral 
psychology, that descriptive psychology and normative theory go hand-in-hand. 
Because of his pragmatist orientation, Kohlberg must be committed to a view 
where his claim can be vindicated by means of the results of the theory. To put the 
point metaphorically, if the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the claim “the 
pudding is delicious” can only be vindicated after tasting it (and in virtue of how 
it tastes), never demonstrated or compelled by considerations prior to the 
eating.23 
 But, given that the assumption is an assumption, why would anyone 
assume that? I propose that there are two reasons Kohlberg made the 
assumption. The first is a reason related to history of the practice of psychology, 
the second related to Kohlberg’s substantive normative commitments.  
 Kohlberg saw the evolution of developmental psychology in the 20th 
century as moving away from behaviorist models to cognitivist models. 
Behaviorist models, focused on stimulus and response, provide an explanation 
where it is assumed that 
the process of learning truths is the same as the processes of learning lies 
or illusions. It explains the learning of logical operations or “truths” in 
                                                             
23 On Kohlberg’s acceptance of his claim as an assumption and his acceptance of 
pragmatic vindication, see p. 225. 
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terms of the same processes as those involved in learning a social dance 
step (which is cognitively neutral), or those involved in “learning” a 
psychosis or a pattern of maze errors (which are cognitively erroneous). 
(1971, p. 152)  
The scare quotes are illustrative. First, learning a dance is not a matter of truth at 
all, according to Kohlberg. Presumably, he has a conception of truth where truth 
is a property of propositions, specifically of propositions of the form “S knows 
that P.”24 A dance is not a proposition – learning the pattern of bodily movements 
that are constitutive of the dance such that you can perform the dance does not 
represent the world as being such-and-such way. To be sure, there is a pattern, and 
one can learn – in a straightforward sense of “learn” – the pattern. But, to learn 
the dance would be an instance of knowledge-how, not knowledge-that. Presumably, 
then, only the contents of ‘knowledge-that’ count as truths. Second, things that 
are “cognitively erroneous,” like lies or illusions or ways through a maze that do 
not get you out of the maze, are not things that can be properly “learned.” This 
suggests that we can only “learn” that which is, in fact, true.  
 By hypothesis, then, we can come to believe that, say, the present king of 
France is bald, but, if in point of fact there is no king of France presently, then we 
did not learn what we believe. Putting these two points together, we can say that, 
                                                             
24 Strictly speaking, the proposition would be “that P,” to which the propositional 
attitude “knowing” attaches. I will treat the entire expression as a proposition 
since I am not particular interested in nor is it relevant to my argument to discuss 
the metaphysics of proposition-hood.  
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for Kohlberg, we can only learn what is true and that the only things that can be 
true are propositions.25  
 But, behaviorism was unable to distinguish between the three cases, 
between the “cognitively true,” the “cognitively erroneous,” and the “cognitively 
neutral.” Specifically, behaviorism could not pick out the “cognitive” as a distinct 
psychological process. But the pioneering work of Piaget on the childhood 
development of concepts like space, time, and causality demonstrates that 
explaining the behavior of children requires philosophical, epistemic notions 
(again, like space, time and causality). (Kohlberg 1971, p. 152). So, a psychology 
rested on behaviorist epistemology was insufficiently explanatory: it did not 
explain the types of things that we know to exist. We know that children have 
certain ways of getting around the world that are more successful than others. 
How do we explain that? –By invoking a cognitive-psychological mechanism 
that makes possible such developments.  
 Kohlberg think that since such an explanation was in the offing in one 
area of developmental psychology, it should be in the offing in all areas of 
developmental psychology. This assumption provides one basis for the 
assumption, the assumption at issue in this paper about the relation of descriptive 
psychology and normative theorizing.  
                                                             
25 We can of course relax the standard to include belief-states that do not have 
fully explicit propositional form. We could have inchoate beliefs, and those could 
still be true, for they are truth-apt (by the hypothesis that for a mental state to be 
a belief state is for it to be truth-apt). 
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 Of course, all this groundwork is to a point already assumed in the 
discipline: if there is development, then the development develops toward 
something or other.26 But this high level of generalization is insufficient for 
Kohlberg. It cannot be the case that our moral cognition – or even cognition more 
generally – develops toward something or other. It has to develop toward some 
thing. That particular thing is going to be the ideal. At the highest level of 
generality, the ideal is the example par excellence of whatever thing is under 
consideration – it is that thing that best exemplifies what makes a thing of that 
type a thing of that type.27 
 In the realm of moral cognition, this means that there must be an ideal 
form of moral thinking. That is, there is a form of moral thinking that best 
exemplifies what makes moral thinking moral thinking. That “best 
exemplification” or ideal specifies (a) what moral cognition develops toward by 
(b) giving a standard against which to measure (c) either alignment with or 
deviation from the standard. At any point along the development trajectory, the 
next level of development contains the previous level and adds something 
distinct. There is need of a next level if, at a level, that level that the development 
is at is unable to solve for problems that the level identifies as problems. The 
development trajectory halts just in case there is a level of development that 
                                                             
26 A tautology, to be sure, but a useful one. It provides prima facie evidence that 
further refinements move away from tautology toward the substantive. The 
substantive can always be denied on the grounds of empirical falsity or 
conceptual incoherence. 
27 This is truly at the highest level of intelligible generality. “Thing” here could 
pick out objects of different kinds – physical and intentional – as well as events, 
sequences, orders and the like. My use is catholic and ecumenical.  
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solves all problems of previous levels while not encountering any problems that 
are recognized as problems from that level.  
 But, how do we find out which form of moral thinking provides that sort 
of “best exemplification?” One way – a pragmatist way, Kohlberg’s way – is to 
ask, “What is moral thinking for?” We try to figure out what role or function 
morality performs for those who have morality. Given that only humans have 
morality, we try to figure out what problems does morality allow humans to 
solve. Kohlberg (1971) has an answer: the function of moral cognition is to 
resolve moral conflicts with others, to give guidance in how we should act in 
different environments, to eliminate moral dilemmas, and to do these things in a 
stable and consistent way (p. 185). The requirements of stability and consistency in 
resolving moral conflicts give rise to demands for a formalistic metaethic with 
certain substantive content claims. The substantive content claims relate to the 
value of persons and to the supreme overriding value of justice. The particular 
details need not bother us here. 
 To summarize, there were two reasons Kohlberg makes the assumption, 
one related to developmental psychology as a discipline and one related to the 
substantive normative commitment he held. The second reason is intimately tied 
to the consequences of the assumption, so although I have broached the topic in 
this section, my extended discussion takes place in the next. 
3 The Assumption: Its Consequences 
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 It just so happens that Kohlberg’s identified function has the salubrious 
effect that it vanquishes a range of views that Kohlberg (1971) does not accept: 
descriptive relativism (p. 176),28 normative relativism (p. 180),29 emotivism (p. 
184),30 epistemological intuitionism (p. 184),31 motivational internalism (pp. 217-
218),32 and critical / analytic metaethics (pp. 224-225).33 Also vanquished is the 
normative theory that corresponds to each level of moral thinking that is lower 
than Stage 6 theory (1971, p. 216): Stage 1’s rule-and-authority obeying morality, 
Stage 2’s rational egoism, Stage 3’s commonsense morality, sentimentalism and 
virtue ethics, Stage 4’s conventional morality and rule-and-authority maintaining 
morality, and Stage 5’s rule-utilitarianism, social contract theories,34 and 
                                                             
28 Descriptive relativism is a moral metaphysic that says that morality differs from 
culture to culture. 
29 Normative relativism is a normative doctrine that says that we should not judge 
people from cultures that have different standards than our own. 
30 Emotivism is a semantic theory that says that the meaning of moral terms is 
captured completely by their emotive content. More specifically, emotivism 
holds that moral language expresses or evinces speaker attitudes, where the 
attitudes are taken as non-cognitive. For the classical position, see (Ayer 1952). 
31 The term “epistemological intuitionism” comes from Williams and is meant to 
contrast with “methodological intuitionism.” Epistemological intuitionism posits 
that we intuit or directly apprehend moral facts by means of a special epistemic 
faculty. G. E. Moore’s metaethic is a classic example. See (Williams 1998b) and 
(Moore 1996). 
32 Motivational internalism is a moral metaphysic that says that morality is, in 
some way to be specified, inherently motivating. In stronger forms, it denies the 
possibility of the amoralist – someone who says, “I understand X is right, but 
why should I care?” Kohlberg’s theory is externalist, in this sense.  
33 Critical/analytic metaethics is a semantic and epistemological theory that says 
that the task of moral philosophy is to clarify the principles that are already 
implicit in “ordinary” moral language. 
34 Some people take Kohlberg to be developing a theory of moral cognition that is 
roughly contractarian. This is a mistake. He writes,  
At stage 5, the core of justice was (a) liberty or civil rights, (b) equality of 
opportunity, and (c) contract. These three ideas were united by respect for 
the freedom of others, as this freedom is embodied in civil law and civil 
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methodological non-relativism. The last theory standing is the morality of Stage 
6 morality: deontological, or principled, intuitionism (1971, p. 212, p. 219).35 What 
is remarkable is the range of types of views that Kohlberg’s assumption plus 
theory licenses him to strike: moral-semantic theories, moral-epistemological 
theories, moral-metaphysical theories, moral-motivational theories, descriptive 
psychological theories, and substantive normative theories.  
 But what is philosophically interesting is that Kohlberg’s moves to strike 
rival theories only work in the context of identifying standards of metaethical 
correctness, and the only way to identify standards of metaethical correctness is 
by appeal to substantive normative theory.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
rights. At stage 6, the sense of justice becomes clearly focused on the rights 
of humanity independent of civil society. (p. 212) 
 Or consider this quote: “We have been arguing that, both by stage 6 normative 
ethical standards and by formalist metaethical criteria, stage 6 is a more moral 
mode of judgment than stages 5 or 4” (p. 217). He does allow that Rawls derives 
Stage 6 morality from Stage 5 morality, but only insofar as the morality pertains 
to social-political choices (which does not exhaust the content of Stage 6 
morality) (p. 226).  
35Kohlberg invokes as representative of Stage 6 morality the kind of morality 
endorsed by Ross and Sidgwick. His claims about motivational externalism and 
the impossibility of answering the amoralist in non-moral terms call to mind 
another deontological intuitionist – namely, Prichard. See (Ross 2002), (Sidgwick 
1981), and Prichard (1912). All in all, Kohlberg’s theory amounts to a rather 
boilerplate recapitulation of the type of deontological moral theorizing prevalent 
in the early 20th century between the publication of Moore’s Principia in 1903 and 
Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic in 1936. Of course, Sidgwick came before this 
period and tried to defend consequentialism. But, he accepted a kind of 
principled intuitionism, which Kohlberg notes even if some contemporary moral 
psychologists – less philosophically able than Kohlberg – deny that Sidgwick 
used intuitions at all (p. 219). Kohlberg’s philosophical mistake is to identify any 
reliance on principles and formalism as underlying a deontological position. 
Deontology just is the normative theory that says that an act is right iff it accords 
with the right moral rule. Sidgwick never accepted that.  
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 Substantive normative morality is the “thick” stuff of the moral life: the 
particular and substantive commitments that we have as moral agents 
embodying a particular moral worldview. For example, a hedonistic maximizing 
utilitarian might have the particular and substantive commitment to eradicate 
factory farming, where the content of her normative reason consists of the idea 
that eliminating factory farming will move the world from one state of affairs to 
another and that the latter state of affairs contains more overall utility as 
measured by pleasure/pain indices. This utilitarian may have a realist metaethic, 
such that she considers her normative reason formally as a mind-independent fact 
and as on a par with the other sorts of facts given realistic interpretations in, say, 
the natural sciences. Her explanation of why her normative reason is normative is 
that it is true that factory farming is wrong. 
 Kohlberg’s theory is like that, not in the sense that his is realist 
utilitarianism but in the sense that substantive morality and metaethical 
theorizing go hand-in-hand. He claims that morality is sui generis and formally 
autonomous – that is, morality is not a subset of any other domain. Because of 
this metaethical “fact,” Kohlberg (1971) can say things like,  
The general criterion we have used in saying that a higher stage’s mode of 
judgment is more adequate than a lower stage is that of morality itself, not 
of conceptions of rationality or sophistication imported from other 
domains. (p. 215) 
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 or like, “We have been arguing that, both by stage 6 normative ethical standards 
and by formalist metaethical criteria, stage 6 is a more moral mode of judgment 
than stages 5 or 4” (p. 217, emphasis mine). And what of this criterion of 
“morality itself?” We get to it by means of the formal metaethical 
characterization of the features of moral thought. The features that we build into 
the formal characterization constrain the choices at the normative level. For 
Kohlberg (1971), the metaethic uniquely determines at least some of the 
substantive normative content to which our moral theory is committed:  
If our formal characterization of the functioning of mature principles is 
correct, it is clear that only principles of justice have an ultimate claim to 
being adequate universal, prescriptive principles. By definition, principles 
of justice are principles for deciding competing claims of individuals, for 
“giving each man his due.” When principles, including considerations of 
human welfare, are reduced to guides for considering such claims, they 
become expressions of the single principle of justice. (pp. 219-220) 
Kohlberg then goes on to discuss taking considerations of human welfare as an 
alternate content claim before rejecting the position for failing to satisfy the 
metaethical constraints of prescriptivity and universality.36 
 But, assume that Kohlberg is right that the metaethical constraints 
uniquely yield the principles of justice as the correct normative principles. And 
                                                             
36 In essence, arguing in the opposite direction – against utilitarianism – from 
universality and prescriptivity than the philosopher most wellknown for 
introducing universal prescriptivism as a metaethical theory. For that other view, 
see (Hare 1981). 
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assume that the metaethical constraints uniquely pick out his descriptive 
psychology. What we have, if Kohlberg is to be believed, is a case of a very 
powerful explanation: moral psychology interlocks with moral epistemology, 
moral metaphysics and moral semantics, which in turn interlocks with first-order 
normative commitments to a contentful principle of justice. In the end of 
explanation, then, moral psychology is linked to substantive normative morality, 
via logical connection.  
4 The Assumption: Its Problems 
 
  Say that you have a particular first-order normative commitment to 
the principles of justice as understood at the Stage 6 level of Kohlberg’s theory. In 
fact, say that you are deeply committed to the principles. Given that you have 
such a commitment, it would be convenient if there were a metaethic that 
uniquely picked out your commitment. Even better, what if that metaethic 
validated one account of moral cognition over all others? Then, in virtue of 
establishing the metaethic by means of laying out the descriptive psychological 
evidence in support of that ethic, you have laid out support for your normative 
commitment. You get the normative commitment for free by means of “logical 
necessity.”  
But, of course, you get the normative commitment for free only in virtue 
of making the metaethic and the psychology out of the materials of the 
normative commitment at hand. You start with the normative commitment, you 
reverse engineer a metaethic that uniquely selects your normative commitment, 
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and you propose a psychological mechanism that is “isomorphic” or “parallel” to 
your metaethic. If there really is an isomorphism, then the psychological 
mechanism must also uniquely select your normative commitment. One way to 
look at the resulting omni-theory is to see it as having great explanatory breadth 
and depth. Another is to see it as an instance of circular reasoning: your 
normative commitment allows you to rule out certain metaethics, which allows 
you to rule out certain psychological mechanisms, which allows you to rule out 
certain metaethics, which allows you to rule out certain other proposed 
normative commitments. But, at no point in the “explanation” have you 
provided anything like a reason to accept the omni-theory for someone not 
already in the grip of the normative commitment. 
 One consequence from the assumption is that it allows the theorist to 
strike all sorts of rival theories, theories in the psychological, metaethical and 
first-order normative domains. A second consequence is that it allows for the 
possibility of the theorist reverse engineering an explanatory and justificatory 
framework for the particular normative commitments she happens to hold. A 
third consequence is that the assumption promotes a circular theory, although 
whether you find the theory virtuously or viciously so will depend on whether 
you accept the point of entry. 
 I do not mean the preceding paragraphs as an opening salvo in yet 
another round of the most boring topic in all of moral philosophy: who has the 
right definition of morality? That topic – definitions of morality and their 
taxonomies – is of vanishingly small importance, for people go on in the absence 
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of such definitions.37 Rather, I suggest that something like the paragraph above 
offers partial explanation for Kohlberg making the assumption at issue for this 
paper. Of course, this is speculative psychology, and there can be no apodictic 
philosophical demonstration of such speculation. But, and this is the upshot, it is 
explanatory of why someone would make Kohlberg’s assumption. As Williams 
gestures at in the epigraph to this paper, when a psychological mechanism that 
has a unique fit with a moral conception is proposed, we do well to wonder if the 
mechanism itself is part of the moral conception. If it is part of the moral 
conception, then why should we accept it as a matter of psychology? To jabber on 
about the sui generis and autonomous nature of morality is, at that point, to 
severely miss the point. So too would giving an architectonic of the thirteen or 
thirty38 definitions of morality from the history of moral philosophy.  
 Skepticism about psychological mechanisms that have unique fits with 
moral conceptions rest upon skepticism about the moral conceptions. Another 
way to put the point is to say that if the mechanism implies the conception, then 
attacks on the conception imply attacks on the mechanism.39 If commitment to the 
moral conception is not compulsory – not obviously right – there is a lurking 
problem for the descriptive theory.  
5 The Minimalist Alternative 
 
                                                             
37 Although it is interesting to observe that some of those most heavily invested in 
preserving the practical status of morality are so concerned with making sure that 
everyone have the right definition in mind. Often, arguments of this sort are 
unclear about the form/content and theory/practice relations. 
38 Or however many artificially selected . . . 
39 An application of modus tollens.  
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 This is not to say that there is a theoretically neutral way to characterize 
the psychology of moral cognition. Nor is it to say that we can excise all of our 
normative commitments in developing our descriptive theories. My call is not a 
call for vulgar positivism or dogmatic intuitionism. Rather, I suggest instead a 
minimalist moral psychology. 
 Borrowing from Williams,40 we can say that a moral psychology is 
minimalist iff it satisfies two conditions. The two conditions go together, but I will 
discuss them in turn. 
 The first condition relates to how much moral content we should place 
into our account of the psychology of human beings. Williams (1998b) writes: 
First, to the question ‘how much should our accounts of distinctively 
moral activity add to our accounts of other human activity?’ it replies ‘as 
little as possible’, and the more that some moral understanding of human 
beings seems to call on materials that specially serve the purposes of 
morality – certain conceptions of the will, for instance – the more reason 
we have to ask whether they may not be a more illuminating account that 
rests only on conceptions that we use anyway elsewhere. (p. 68) 
Williams in this passage is talking about conceptions of the will like Kant’s, 
conceptions where there is always a double-action.41 But, the particular details 
                                                             
40 Who in turn borrowed from Nietzsche. 
41 The point: for each action, that account of willing adds another – namely, the 
action of willing! The action of willing is marshaled as an explanation of action, 
but it cannot really serve as an explanation of action (any more than Unmoved 
Mover arguments “explain” the sequence of events in the natural order). The 
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need not concern us. What is relevant is that we have an account of human 
cognition. Of this account of cognition, we should import as little specifically 
moral material as possible in constructing it. This, too, should hold for our 
accounts of moral cognition. We try to provide accounts of moral cognition: how 
much should our descriptive account of moral cognition import from our normative 
commitments as agents involved in interacting with others as moral agents?  
 Kohlberg’s answer: “Quite a bit.” We import a conception of justice linked 
closely to a very special notion of human beings as free and equal moral persons 
with inviolable dignity. We import a conception of moral judgment with strong 
demands related to universalizability, prescriptivity, and so on. We import a 
conception of the relation of the two where the formal features of moral 
judgment uniquely yield the substantive content that is the first-order 
commitment to justice.42  
 Of course, Kohlberg (1971) claims that his metaethical conception of the 
later stages as more moral than the earlier stages does not amount to a normative 
ethical principle (p. 217). And he claims that his Stage 6 principles do not directly 
require any rule of action or theory of the good (p. 217). But each claim is simply 
not true and simply not true on his own account. The metaethical conception 
does amount to a normative ethical principle: since anyone at a stage can 
understand the reasoning of any stage lower and since occupying a stage does 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
question arises, “What explains the willing?” and there is no good answer for 
that in the offing. Hence, Kant invokes transcendental psychology and noumenal 
purposes, explaining the difficult by means of the baffling. See (Kant 1998), 
especially the third section. 
42 As understood in its Stage 6 interpretation. 
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not directly determine43 that you will think only in terms of that stage, it is 
possible, at any stage above the first, for you to choose your approach the 
structure with which you are trying to achieve equilibrium. Say I am at Stage 3. I 
can choose between deciding to do something on the basis of virtue ethical 
considerations or deciding to do something on the basis of rational egoistic 
considerations (i.e., Stage 2). Kohlberg’s theory says that I should deliberate from 
Stage 3. It is normative: it “authoritatively” tell me which path to pick among 
options and “resolves” the “moral conflict” of choosing between deliberative 
stages.  
 Consider now the Stage 6 principles of justice: they say that it is best to 
regard people as free and equal moral persons with inviolable dignity. It defies 
my comprehension that this does not amount to a rule of action. If I can choose 
between an action in accordance with the principle and one not, I should always 
chooses to act in accordance with the principle, according to the principle. If there is 
a preponderance of principles, I should choose the action that satisfies more of 
the principles than any other available course of action. I see no other way to 
read the claim.  
 This last paragraphs shows how much the assumption assumes. It 
assumes quite a bit of distinctively moral content – about the nature of 
obligations, about the moral nature of human beings, and about permissible 
                                                             
43 That is, with causal necessity. 
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action. This is to say that contrary to Kohlberg’s claims, his theory does have 
something to say about the nature of the good and the nature of approbation.44 
 I will give a first approximation as to what counts as importing as little 
distinctively moral content in a bit. But, before I do, I must lay out the second 
aspect of the minimalist position, for the second aspect goes some way toward 
that first approximation. Williams (1998a) continues: 
This demand for moral psychological minimalism is not, however, just an 
application of an Occamist desire for economy, and this is the second 
aspect of the Nietzschean general attitude. Without some guiding sense of 
what materials we should use in giving our economical explanations, such 
an attitude will simply fall back into the difficulties we have already met. 
Nietzsche’s approach is to identify an excess of moral content in 
psychology by appealing first to what an experienced, honest, subtle, and 
unoptimistic interpreter might make of human behavior elsewhere. (p. 68) 
                                                             
44 Namely, that it is good to do the right thing by treating other humans as free and 
equal moral persons and that punishment may be required, as a matter of fact 
given a limited set of available actions, for distinctively moral reasons not related 
to concerns of social utility (where social utility is read in a consequentialist, 
read: non-principled, way). That a deontological theory of the right has plenty to 
say about the good did not strike other early 20th century deontological or 
principled intuitionists as wrong. See (Ross 2002). The whole point of Ross’s 
theory was to invert Moore’s analysis. (Moore 1996) says that ‘good’ is a sui 
generis concept but that ‘right’ is analyzable in terms of being productive of the 
good. For Ross, ‘right’ is the sui generis concept, and ‘good’ is analyzable in terms 
of being productive of the right. This rather obvious fact is still accepted as rather 
obvious in the way that we introduce undergraduates to consequentialism and 
deontology: a common gloss is that consequentialism defines the right through 
the good and that deontology defines the good through the right.  
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The kind of “economical explanations” at issue here are explanations of the 
naturalized sort. Here I endorse Brian Leiter’s (2002) reading of Nietzsche as 
primarily a soft methodological naturalist.45 Soft methodological naturalism holds 
that philosophical enquiries should be continuous with the methods of successful 
natural and social sciences, including “styles of explanation and understanding 
employed in the sciences” (Leiter 2002, p. 4). Nietzsche is a substantive naturalist 
with respect to ruling out all forms of supernaturalistic – theistic or deistic – 
explanation. I take Williams’s position to be the same, and I too subscribe to soft 
methodological naturalism combined with substantive naturalism about 
theological talk.  
 The “difficulties we have already met” refers to the difficulties in general 
with provided a naturalized moral psychology. These are the particular difficulties 
that I have been claiming beset Kohlberg’s theory. Williams (1998a) again: 
If a ‘naturalistic’ moral psychology has to characterize moral activity in a 
vocabulary that can be equally applied to every other part of nature, then 
it is committed to a physicalistic reduction that is clearly hopeless. If it is 
to describe moral activity in terms that can be applied to something else, 
but not everything else, we have not much idea what those terms may be, 
or how ‘special’ moral activity is allowed to be, consonantly with 
naturalism. If we are allowed to describe moral activity in whatever terms 
                                                             
45 See especially chapter 1, “Introduction: Nietzsche, naturalist or postmodernist,” 
pp. 1-30. 
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moral activity may seem to invite, naturalism excludes nothing, and we 
are back at the beginning. (p. 67) 
We have three options for naturalizing moral cognition: in terms of a general 
purpose discourse that applies to every other part of nature, in terms of whatever 
discourse moral cognition seems to invite, or in terms of some in-between 
discourse – a discourse where some things apply but not all. I agree with 
Williams that the first option is hopeless: the only candidate option is theoretical 
physics, and it would both be a fool’s errand and a serious misunderstanding of 
moral thought to try to characterize it in terms of fundamental particles (or their 
fields) worked upon by forces understood as laws of nature. It is the wrong level 
of explanation altogether. So, that only leaves two options: allow in whatever 
discourse morality requires or seems to require, or describe morality in a 
discourse that is outside of morality yet the universe of which is “suitably 
restricted.”  
 Kohlberg opts for the first of the remaining two options: in order to 
explain moral cognition, he will invoke whatever terms moral cognition seem to 
him to invite. This includes the terms in his formalistic metaethics and the 
determinate and substantive content of Stage 6 morality. It also includes the 
determinate and substantive content of each stage prior to Stage 6. That is to say, 
in explaining what makes the lower stages stages, given the assumption, 
Kohlberg calls on the determinate and substantive content of all possible 
morality systems and folk moral worldviews. Strictly speaking, rational egoism, 
virtue ethics, conventionalism, legalism, social contract theories, and 
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utilitarianism are all present in the theory, if only to be subordinated under the 
master notions of justice and deontological intuitionism. He excludes nothing: 
protests that pre-conventional moralities (Stages 1 and 2) are not proper 
moralities (because not properly principled) are themselves unprincipled, given 
that each higher stage must recognize the previous stage as something from which 
it sprang.  
 The last remaining option is the only real option for naturalistic moral 
psychology, hence for moral psychology. But, the last option directly cuts against 
the assumption. If we do not know how the restrict our universe of discourse, 
then how can we know, either in advance or as a result of “investigation,” which 
terms are the genuinely referring terms that carry sense? Does moral cognition 
have to be universal and prescriptive? If so, is there a basis for that besides 
antipathy for relativism?  
 I should quickly note that Kohlberg’s strategy with regard to relativism is 
to show that all versions rest on different “logical fallacies.”46 That is an 
insufficient strategy. Relativism may well rest on a mistake and be conceptually 
                                                             
46 Another unfortunate habit that Kohlberg picked up from early 20th century 
metaethicists is the habit of labeling all opponent views as resting on a fallacy or 
a mistake. Besides expressing a generally negative outlook about the cognitive 
abilities of the interlocutor, such moves also involve some narcissistic preening. 
See the end of (Kohlber 1971) where he is discussing truths passed down from 
Socrates, truths that psychologists have not accepted. Kohlberg’s explanation: “Is 
it so surprising that psychologists have never understood Socrates? It is hard to 
understand if you are not stage 6” (p. 232). That statement has pretty sour 
implicature: either Kohlberg is not stage 6 but is smart enough to overcome the 
deficiency (unlike all his opponents), and he is stage 6 and so is both smarter and 
better than his opponents. 
57 
 
incoherent.47 That does not show that universalism is conceptually coherent. You 
need additional premises: relativism and universalism are the only options, they 
are mutually exclusive, they are opposite such that the falsity of one implies the 
truth of the other, and so on. And you need to exhaust all possible logical types 
of relativism and universalism. Needless to say, Kohlberg did not accomplish 
that daunting task. And, there may be in principle reasons why he could not. 
After all, if, as Kohlberg claims, moralities are constructions putting responses in 
equilibrium with structures, then, as environments and material conditions 
continue to change, what counts as “equilibrium” is also subject to that change. 
This is another way of saying that Kohlberg’s identification of the function of 
morality is merely a reflection of his own personal predilection.48 
 The important point is that we are not compelled to accept Kohlberg’s 
analysis. There is a minimalist option of the table. The minimalist option need 
not necessarily be relativist: it is possible to develop a universalist minimalism. 
                                                             
47 What I call “vulgar relativism” is surely incoherent: P1. Morality varies across 
cultures. P2. There is no overarching standard by which to judge among other 
cultures. So, C., Don’t judge and be tolerant!  
48 This is yet another reason to avoid the most boring question in moral 
philosophy. We can allow that “morality” means this or that or the other while 
still saying that the function of morality is such-and-such. To bring in an 
illustration from perception, we can say that “X looks red” means “X has the 
micro-physical structure corresponding to red” or “X seems red to person P in 
circumstance C” or “Red is the quality of my sense-datum in relation to 
perceiving thing X.” Regardless, we could still identify the function of X looking 
red by means of the causal role looking red plays in behavior (say, in identifying 
pomegranates). But, where there are multiple possible functions in play and 
where the function is given a self-referential role, then assigning non-reductive 
content to the function becomes problematic. Example: the function of morality 
could be to allow the weak to keep the strong in check, or the function of 
morality could be to allow us to solve moral conflicts. On the basis of what do we 
identify the function? On the basis of what do we say that there is a “the 
function?”   
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The universalist minimalism imports very little into the psychology: it would not 
import, for example, universal prescriptivism or full role reversal. It would 
explain particular moral judgments by means of other ready-to-hand tools that do 
not have distinctive moral content: here I am thinking of theories of social norms, 
decision theory, theories of rationality, theories of politics and so on.49 
6 Meta-Theoretical Considerations in Favor of Minimalism 
 
 So, we have to choose between the Kohlbergian assumption and the 
minimalist paradigm. I argue that there are two meta-theoretical considerations 
that should have some weight in pushing us toward minimalism: first, morality 
systems in general are incoherent, and second, metaethical theorizing, once 
already in the naturalistic purview, is unlikely to have any effect on first-order 
cognition. 
 First, morality systems in general are incoherent. From a naturalistic 
perspective, this is unsurprising. If morality systems are the products of 
biological and cultural evolution, reflecting a line of constant adjustments from 
different pressures, then we ought to expect that morality cannot be reflectively 
coherent. Outside of the morality systems themselves, the stuff of ethical life – 
our thoughts and practices related to getting along with along humans with 
killing them – is itself not the kind of thing that can hang neatly together. If we 
assume, as seems entirely reasonable,50 that there are ineliminable moral 
dilemmas in the actual world and if we combine that assumption with the 
                                                             
49 On social norms, see (Bicchieri 2005).  
50 See (Marcus 1980). 
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conception of morality as dilemma-solver in the actual world,51 then morality is 
more likely than not incoherent. It probably cannot perform what it claims is its 
function to perform. We eliminate the incoherence by abandoning one of the 
claims, and that move will reflect antecedent normative commitments that we 
have about the nature of obligation as such. 
 Besides coherence, there remains the fact that metaethical theorizing, like 
many kinds of philosophical theorizing, is extremely “light.” What I mean by this 
is that these second-order theorizings rarely have first-order effects. Think of 
Hume and his account of causality. Hume’s second-order skepticism did not 
prevent him from judging accurately the trajectory of billiard balls at the bar. 
Would second-order optimism have made much of a difference? Likewise, 
Kohlberg himself argues that, even though there is a difference between different 
philosophical conceptions of ‘morality,’ there are no fundamental differences 
between those philosophical conceptions when those conceptions are measured 
as against psychological conceptions. Now, I find this implausible, for a 
naturalized position would be a philosophical conception but would look an 
awful lot like a psychological conception. Still, given what we know about the 
relations in general between first and second-order theories, we should be highly 
skeptical of any claim giving priority to a second-order theory to uniquely 
determine first-order content about which the second-order theory theorizes. 
Humean skepticism with regard to causality does not issue in first-order 
                                                             
51 One of Kohlberg’s assumptions. 
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skepticism that if I drop this cup, it will fall to the ground. What special reason is 
there for assuming the moral case is different than that?52 
 I conclude that there has not been good reason to accept the assumption. 
There is an alternative on the table – minimalism. Meta-theoretical considerations 
favor minimalism over the assumption. This considers are not positivist 
applications of a principle of parsimony; rather, they emerge from a meditation 
on the substance of the moral life as lived. Theory cannot assume away the 
world. Nor can it make unintelligible practice. 
7 Conclusion: Realism and Naturalism in Moral Psychology 
 
 In my paper, I showed that Kohlberg had a strong assumption about an 
isomorphism or parallelism between descriptive accounts of the development of 
moral cognition and normative accounts of (a) the right formalist metaethic 
combined with (b) certain substantive normative claims about the nature of 
justice and persons. And I argued against it on the basis of an existing alternative 
and metatheoretical considerations. But, moral psychology as a field has moved 
far past Kohlberg, and today the field is one generating great enthusiasm and 
interests across academic disciplines.  
                                                             
52 Again, this is with the caveat that we are already working within a paradigm of 
naturalistic moral psychology. If you have subscribe to a supernaturalistic 
metaethic, I am more than willing to admit that giving up that metaethic would 
have profound and pervasive effects on the contents of your first-order beliefs. 
But I believe that only on the basis of lots of empirical evidence – social-scientific, 
personal-anecdotal, and cultural-historical. But a lot of the case from certain 
kinds of constructivists and expressivists on this matter about how metaethical 
positions are kinds of normative positions just emphasizes the fact of the 
normative horse pushing all the carts. 
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 There are at least two kinds of moral psychology: first, a psychology that 
takes as its subject matter those behaviors identified as “moral,” and, second, a 
philosophy that takes as its subject matter those theories identified as “moral.” In 
each kind of moral psychology, then, a practitioner must have some antecedent 
conception of “moral” that she brings to bear on her subject matter.53  
 However, when philosophers talk about ‘moral psychology,’ they mean to 
restrict discussion to something rather particular. They often mean to talk about 
moral psychology as a way of ruling out certain normative ethical theories. The 
argument frequently goes like this: normative ethical theories presuppose a 
picture of human nature, and if particular picture of human nature presupposed 
by a particular normative ethical theory is false, that gives us reason to reject the 
normative ethical theory. 
 This is fine, as far as it goes. But, it does not go very far. This is related to a 
point that I tried to make at the end of the paper: we do not know how much to 
include into our universe of moral discourse. And, naturalism, per se, seems to be 
of no help in helping us get closer to an answer. 
 This does mean that we must make a value judgment with respect how 
we plan on partitioning the world. And it is here that I reassert the value of 
realism over naturalism. “Realism” here is not about a doctrine of mind-
                                                             
53 Some philosophers – namely Kant but also his followers, direct or indirect – 
took this rather plain fact as a great triumph, an indication of the autonomy of 
normative ethical theory from the messy realities of what used to be called 
“philosophical anthropology.” I never understood how that inference was 
supposed to work, especially given Kant’s embrace of “ought implies can.” See 
(Kant 1998). 
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independence.54 Recall this quote from Williams (1998a): “Nietzsche’s approach is 
to identify an excess of moral content in psychology by appealing first to what an 
experienced, honest, subtle, and unoptimistic interpreter might make of human 
behavior elsewhere” (p. 67). The “realism” under discussion refers to the type of 
attitude we take our interpreter to have. She is “realistic” with respect to the true 
sources of human behavior, but that does not mean that she accepts nihilism or 
amoralism or whatever other bogeyman dreamt up by the moral philosopher. A 
way of being realistic is by adopting a hermeneutics of suspicion. In was by 
adopting this realistic method that I was able to make the conjecture that at least 
part of what motivated Kohlberg to accept the assumption was a particular 
commitment to a particular form of morality with particular content claims, 
related to justice and persons.  
 But, as Williams (1998a) is right to point out, the method works only if 
you are not suspicious of everything (pp. 68-69). In a way, it is like skepticism or 
projectivism. Skepticism only works if there is at least one thing you are not 
skeptical about, from which you can launch your skeptical doubts, projectivism 
only work if there is some thing upon which the projection projects.55 These points 
indicate a problem with taking skepticism or expressivism as global attitudes, 
commitments, or methods. Likewise for suspicion. 
 Does this mean, then, that there must be at least one substantively 
normative commitment that we must make if we are to theorize about moral 
                                                             
54 However finessed.  
55 For local moral expressivists, the “natural world” is that which is projected 
upon. See (Blackburn 1993). 
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cognition at all? I do not think this follows. If we read “substantively normative” 
as indicating the type of commitment that Kohlberg had to his principles of 
justice, we need not be committed to any such thing. His commitment was not 
defeasible, for him, as it must be for the realist.56  
                                                             
56 I thank Cristina Bicchieri, Molly Sinderbrand, Kyle Adams for discussions 
related to earlier forms of this paper. All faults remain my own. 
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LOCATING THE NORMATIVE INSIGNIFICANCE OF NEUROSCIENCE 
1 Introduction  
 
In this paper, my broad aim is to identify some problems with the moral 
psychology by focusing in particular on the debate between Selim Berker and 
Joshua Greene. Greene has steadily produced work that draws upon the 
resources of both neuroscience and social psychology to give an explanation of 
moral psychology57 – and, according to him, an explanation of moral philosophy 
itself.58 Berker, on the other hand, is a humanist critic of Greene’s approach (and, 
in the end, of any approach that attempts to draw upon empirical facts to reveal 
normative truths, insights, or predictions).59  
 The plan for the paper is as follows: first, I will present Berker’s Dilemma 
for any account that attempts to use neuroscience (and neuroscientific evidence) 
to draw normative conclusions. I argue that Berker mischaracterizes Greene’s 
position or assumes fairly strong normative commitments disallowed by the 
                                                             
57 See (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen 2001), (Greene 2003), 
(Greene & Haidt 2002), and (Greene 2007).  
58 Consider this passage (that many humanists find deeply confused) from 
(Greene 2013): 
At some point, it dawns on you: Morality is not what generations of 
philosophers and theologians have thought it to be. Morality is not a set of 
freestanding abstract truths that we can somehow access with our limited 
human minds. Moral psychology is not something that occasionally 
intrudes into the abstract realm of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is 
a manifestation of moral psychology. Moral philosophies are, once again, 
just the intellectual tips of much bigger and deeper psychological and 
biological icebergs. Once you’ve understood this, your whole view of 
morality changes. Figure and ground reverse, and you see competing 
moral philosophies not just as points in an abstract philosophical space 
but as the predictable products of our dual-process brains. (p. 329) 
59 See (Berker 2009) and (Berker 2014). 
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principles of Minimal Moral Psychology. In particular, Greene is not committed 
to many of the invalid inferences that Berker addresses, and Greene is not trying 
to draw normative conclusions merely from descriptive neuroscientific premises. 
However, I think that Berker’s Dilemma does stick to Greene inasmuch as he 
attempts to use neuroscientific evidence to support psychological theory that in 
turn is meant to support classical utilitarianism as the correct decision procedure 
for resolving intrapersonal and interpersonal normative disagreement.60 When 
we examine Greene’s arguments, we see that it is in the move to support a grand 
metamorality that Greene falls prey to Berker’s Dilemma. I conclude by reflecting 
on how my diagnosis of the problems with both Berker and Greene should be, in 
principle, acceptable to each. 
2 Summary of Greene’s Original Work 
 
 A large part of Greene’s earlier research, starting in 2001, attempts to bring 
neuroscientific evidence to bear on the Trolley Problem. For the sake of 
simplicity, let us say that the “Trolley Problem” is the problem of resolving the 
apparent conflict between judgments concerning the “Switch” and “Footbridge” 
thought experiments:  
SWITCH: “You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching 
a fork in the tracks. On the tracks extending to the left is a group of five 
railway workmen. On the tracks extending to the right is a single railway 
workman. If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, causing 
the deaths of the five workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these 
workmen is to hit a switch on your dashboard that will cause the trolley to 
proceed to the right, causing the death of the single workman. Is it 
                                                             
60 That is, Berker’s Dilemma sticks to the main argument of (Greene 2013) but not 
to earlier arguments about the harm domain. 
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appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the 
five workmen?” 
 
FOOTBRIDGE: “A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward 
five workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present 
course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the 
approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this foot- 
bridge is a stranger who happens to be very large. The only way to save 
the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and 
onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the trolley. The 
stranger will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved. Is it 
appropriate for you to push the stranger onto the tracks in order to save 
the five workmen?” 
 
Most respondents say “Yes” to Switch but “No” to Footbridge. The interesting 
question, then, is what makes the two cases distinct? 
 As Berker (2009) correctly notes, the traditional response in much of the 
philosophical literature prior to Greene was to assume that the judgments about 
the cases were correct (pp. 297-298).61 That is, assume that “Yes” to Switch but 
“No” to Footbridge are the correct normative answers. On such an assumption, 
the task of the philosopher, then, was to locate some normative principle or other 
that could (1) account for the difference in judgments about the cases but (2) be 
robust or anti-fragile enough such that the principle could survive other cases 
                                                             
61 This is, I think, a fair interpretation of much of the trolley case literature, 
running from (Foot 1967) through (Thomson 1976), (Thomson 1985), (Kamm 
1989) and others. If you are an act-utilitarian, then you should be committed to 
the view that answers to Switch and Footbridge should be the same. But, so long 
as you are not an act-utilitarian such as Unger, then you have theoretical wiggle 
room to come up with some other sort of account as to why judgments about the 
cases do not violate a norm of consistency.  
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without generation of counterintuitive result.62 So, for example, the Doctrine of 
Double Effect satisfies (1) but fails to satisfy (2), given that many moral 
philosophers feel that it generates counterintuitive results in other trolley case 
variants.63 
 It’s arguable that, to date, there has been no normative theoretical 
explanation put forward that satisfies (1) and (2). If that is the case, then there are 
two other options available: a kind of intuitionist particularism that denies the 
need to satisfy (2) or a positivistic descriptive accounts that seeks to identify the 
psychological factors – whatever they may be – that underlie the difference in 
judgments.  
 Greene’s work on neuroethics64 takes the latter option. First, he starts with 
a pair of distinctions. First, distinguish two classes of judgment: 
“characteristically consequentialist” and “characteristically deontological” 
(Greene 2007). Judgments are “characteristically consequentialist” if they are 
supported by a consequentialist criterion of right action, and they are 
“characteristically deontological” if they are in line with a judgment that 
                                                             
62 This is just an application of the method of cases or conceptual analysis. 
Assume the intuitions or judgments about the original cases are correct, find a 
principle that captures a morally relevant difference between the cases, test the 
principle against other cases, and rotate cases until you refine the principle such 
that it covers all cases or until you run out of cases.  
63 Such as, for example, the Loop Variant. See (Thomson 1985). 
64 “Neuroethics” is ambiguous between the neuroscience of ethics and the ethics 
of neuroscience. Whenever I use “neuroethics” in this paper, I am always 
referring to the neuroscience of ethics. See (Farah 2010). 
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separates deontological from consequentialist judgments.65 Under this loose 
schema, “Yes” to Switch is characteristically consequentialist, and “No” to 
Footbridge is characteristically deontological. Second, distinguish between two 
kinds of psychological process. There are “emotional processes” that involve 
behaviorally-valenced information processing that produces automatic effects, 
and there are “cognitive processes” that involve inherently neutral 
representation that do not produce automatic behavioral effects (Greene 2007).  
 If you combine these distinctions in the relevant way, then you get 
Greene’s hypothesis that characteristically consequentialist judgments are driven 
by cognitive processes while characteristically deontological judgments are 
driven by emotional processes. In order to test the hypothesis neuroscientifically, 
Greene takes two steps: first, identify areas of the brain that other neuroscientific 
research implicates as necessary for emotional and cognitive processing. For 
simplicity, let’s say that previous neuroscientific research has implicated the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and amygdala as necessary for emotional 
processing and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as necessary for cognitive 
processing. Then, one can test, using available neuroscientific methods such as 
fMRI, which brain areas preferentially respond to characteristically 
consequentialist and deontological judgments. 
                                                             
65 There are an obvious number of problems with this way of marking the classes. 
One is marked by reference to a criterion of right action, the other by similarity 
or resemblance. The “characteristically” does a lot of work here as well, for there 
are disputes about whether the sorts of judgments Greene is interested in are 
those that align with judgments rendered from the theoretical perspective. But I 
will not delve deeper into these concerns here. For criticism of Greene on this 
point, see (Kahane & Shackel 2010). 
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 A final note, which Berker also picks up on, is that fMRI is statistically 
noisy, so you need to test against a large number of cases that have relevant 
similarity to Switch and Footbridge. That requires that you hypothesize which 
property may make a difference between the two cases. Greene’s original 
hypothesis was that the difference maker was “personalness.” That is, 
Footbridge is a “personal” case, while Switch is “impersonal.” Alternatively, 
Footbridge satisfies but Switch does not the “ME HURT YOU” criterion: 
The “hurt” criterion [= (a)] picks out the most primitive kinds of harmful 
violations (e.g., assault rather than insider trading) while the “you” 
criterion [= (b)] ensures that the victim be vividly represented as an 
individual. Finally, the “me” criterion [= (c)] captures a notion of 
“agency,” requiring that the action spring in a direct way from the agent’s 
will, that it be “authored” rather than merely “edited” by the agent. 
(Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen 2001) 
With this criterion, one can generate enough cases of meant to be relevantly 
similar to Switch and Footbridge and then use neuroscientific methods of 
investigation to see if characteristically consequentialist and deontological 
judgments track the distinction and then whether emotional and cognitive 
processing corresponds to the judgments. 
 Greene found that personal dilemmas tended to generate 
characteristically deontological judgments and activate emotional processing, 
while impersonal dilemmas tended to generate characteristically consequentialist 
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judgments and activate cognitive processing. Response times for emotionally 
“incongruent” judgments to personal dilemmas (that is, “Yes” to Footbridge) 
took longer (on average two second more) than “congruent” answers (“No to 
Footbridge). As Berker (2009) summarizes Greene’s findings: “All told, Greene et 
al.’s empirical results present an impressive case for their dual-process 
hypothesis” (p. 305). 
 To summarize: Greene analyzed the Trolley Problem descriptively and 
used available neuroscientific techniques to try to isolate a property that would 
allow for a descriptive account of the Trolley Problem. He found some 
neuroscientific evidence that characteristically consequentialist judgments tend 
to correlate with cognitive processing and that characteristically deontological 
judgments tend to correlate with emotional processing. The descriptive property 
that figured as the difference maker was “personalness,” where this is spelled 
out in terms of the ME HURT YOU criterion. From this finding, Greene has 
argued for a dual-process theory of moral cognition, according to which there are 
two systems of moral judgments. One system is quick, automatic, emotional and 
behaviorally valenced, while the other is slow, deliberate, cognitive and 
representationally neutral. 
3 Berker’s Dilemma 
 
 We have just seen that Berker admits that Greene’s finds count as 
evidence for the dual-process hypothesis and that the case is impressive. 
Although Berker does have some quibbles with some aspects of the empirical 
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methodology that Greene used, his primary complaint centers on the normative 
implications that Greene (and others) attempt to draw from Greene’s work. 
 Famously, Greene is not just interested in neuroethics or in showing that 
neuroscientific evidence supports the dual-process theory. He is also interested 
in showing that neuroethics is normatively significant. That is, he is interested, at 
least partly, in showing that we have reason to discount or reject 
characteristically deontological judgments but not characteristically 
consequentialist ones.  
 Berker correctly notes that this would have widespread implications for 
normative theorizing, the most obvious of which is that most normative 
theorizing ought to be abandoned as it would be a post hoc rationalization of 
existing emotional biases. And Greene does push this line of argument against 
deontological rationalists in some of his writings.66 
 However, it is not entirely clear how exactly Greene’s argument is 
supposed to work or even what the argument is. Attempting to pin Greene 
down, Berker (2009) delivers the following dilemma: 
BERKER’S DILEMMA: [E]ither attempts to derive normative 
implications from these neuroscientific results rely on a shoddy inference, 
or they appeal to substantive normative intuitions (usually about what 
sorts of features are or are not morally relevant) that render the 
neuroscientific results irrelevant to the overall argument. (p. 294) 
                                                             
66 See (Greene 2007) especially. 
73 
 
The first thing to notice is that the dilemma is destructive. Either horn is fatal to 
Greene’s larger normative project. Remember that the project is, in part, reliant 
upon a psychological debunking argument. In short, the relevant psychological 
data debunks the class of characteristically deontological judgments but leaves 
intact the class of characteristically consequentialist judgments.67 Since these two 
classes are supposed to be exhaustive68 of moral judgments and since we must 
make some moral judgment or other in dilemma cases, we have reason to rely on 
characteristically consequentialist judgments. However, the first horn says that 
this conclusion is invalidly drawn. It could be correct but not on the basis of any 
of the neuroscientific results. On the other horn, the neuroscientific results are 
wholly irrelevant because of a substantive normative intuition about which 
features are morally relevant. The moral intuition is doing all the work, and the 
neuroscience is idle accoutrement. Either way, moral philosophers need not be 
worried by Greene. 
  I have discussed Greene’s work with many members of the humanist 
tradition, and most of these people have been unimpressed with his work. Some 
feel that it does not live up to the argumentative standards of contemporary 
Anglo-American philosophy, particularly the sort of argumentative standards 
that are present in analytic metaethics. But most feel that Berker effectively 
demonstrated that neuroscience per se lacks normative significance or normative 
                                                             
67 And because the data for the psychological debunking story is part 
neuroscientific and looking for a natural kind, this kind of debunking strategy is 
different than a cultural debunking one. I don’t have the space to further expand 
this point here. 
68 This is, of course, a very controversial point. Personally, I do not believe that the 
two classes exhaust the domain. But I grant this for the sake of argument. 
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upshot. But, with certain exceptions,69 many of these humanists have been 
unwilling to tackle Greene’s arguments head-on. Rather, these humanists have 
just taken as obvious that Greene’s arguments are bad (or obviously demonstrated 
as bad). I will argue that this is a mistake. Humanists ought to take Greene 
seriously and engage with the substance of his views, rather than rely upon 
second-hand judgments and antecedent normative commitments as excuse to 
dismiss his research program.  
4 Critique of Berker 
 
With that in mind, I will turn now to my criticism of Berker. If I can show 
that Berker either mischaracterizes Greene’s position or relies upon strong 
normative commitments, then I can show that we have reason to reject Berker’s 
location of the normative insignificant of neuroscience.  
4.1 First Horn Explained 
 
 Let’s start with the first horn. There, Berker says that attempts to derive 
normative implications from the neuroscience rely on shoddy (read: invalid) 
inference. My strategy here is to quickly survey Berker’s proposed invalid 
arguments and to argue that either Greene never proposed them in the first place 
or that Berker is reading Greene in an aggressively uncharitable manner. 
                                                             
69 Along with Berker, see (Kleingeld 2014), (Wielenberg 2014), and (Lott 2016). 
None pursue the line of argumentation I provide in this paper of addressing in 
particular the problematic descriptive component of Greene’s program – the 
characterization of System 2, which I discuss later – to provide the humanistic 
critique. 
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 Here is the first example of shoddy inference Berker (2009, p. 316) 
proposes: 
REASON GOOD, EMOTION BAD 
P. Deontological intuitions are driven by emotions, whereas 
consequentialist intuitions involve abstract reasoning. 
C. So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, do not 
have any genuine normative force. 
 
The problem, obviously, is that the conclusion does not follow from the premise. 
You need a bridging premise – perhaps: “all and only intuitions involving 
abstract reasoning but not driven by emotions have normative force.” But, 
further, this bridging premise could be secured only on the basis of arguing 
against a long tradition in ethics that says that emotions disclose normative 
truths.70 So the argument is invalid, and even if it weren’t, it would be 
tendentious and unsupported. 
 The second example of shoddy inference: 
ARGUMENT FROM HEURISTICS 
P1. Deontological intuitions are driven by emotions, whereas 
consequentialist intuitions involve abstract reasoning. 
P2. In other domains, emotional processes tend to involve fast and frugal 
(and hence unreliable) heuristics. 
C1. So, in the moral domain, the emotional processes that drive 
deontological intuitions involve fast and frugal (and hence unreliable) 
heuristics. 
C2. So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, are 
unreliable. 
                                                             
70 See (Berker 2009, p. 316). 
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There are two shoddy inferences here. First, identifying something as a heuristic 
presupposes we can tell the difference between right and wrong answer and how 
to reliably get to them. This is a problem with the validity of inferring C1 from P1 
and P2. It could be the case that emotional processes in other domains are 
unreliable but not in the moral-harm domain. Second, consequentialist 
judgments also likely rely on heuristics, given that we are boundedly rational 
agents.71 This is the inference from C1 to C2. These inferential problems are to the 
side of the argument that some heuristics are highly (perhaps perfectly) reliable. 
So the argument is invalid, and even if it weren’t, it would be tendentious and 
unsupported. 
 Here is the third and final example of shoddy inference: 
EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY 
P. Our emotion-driven deontological intuitions are evolutionary by-
products that were adapted to handle an environment we no longer find 
ourselves in. 
C. So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, do not 
have any genuine normative force. 
 
This is perfectly parallel to the first argument. C obviously does not follow from 
P without a further bridging principle linking environmental adaptation to 
normative force. And this is aside from the fact that mathematical and scientific 
judgments have normative force but evolutionary history. Greene could try to 
                                                             
71 That is, our brains do not compute all actual and expected consequences of 
actions, and we have limited memory, computational powers, and so on. 
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save the account through an appeal to tracking, but then neuroscience drops out 
of the picture. So the argument is invalid, and even if it weren’t, it would be 
tendentious and unsupported, or neuroscience would be wholly irrelevant.  
4.2 Reply to First Horn 
 
 Notice that in all of the arguments, either they are invalid or tendentious 
while unsupported. That is, all of these arguments are constructed in such a way 
that they are obviously invalid. On the assumption that we should not attribute 
obviously invalid arguments to our interlocutors because of a demand of the 
Principle of Charity, we should not attribute the charge of shoddy inference to 
Greene.72 
 It is true that sometimes philosophers put forward invalid arguments. 
And it is true that there is a phenomenon of the Principle of Charity going on 
holiday. I mean that there are circumstances in which, in the move to be 
charitable toward an interlocutor, we completely misconstrue their arguments by 
cleaning them up for him or her.  
 However, I claim that the Principle of Charity demands that if we want to 
attribute invalid arguments to our interlocutors, we better have airtight textual 
evidence. I think that this is a claim that all philosophers have reason to accept. It 
allows us to err on the side of charity while at the same time being able to call a 
spade a “spade.” 
                                                             
72 See (Davidson 1984). 
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 So my primary argument that Greene is not making these invalid 
arguments is that, if he were, surely a philosopher as careful and thoughtful as 
Berker would’ve cited instances of the invalid arguments. Berker does not cite 
any instances, so Greene is not making these invalid arguments. 
 In the end, I think that Berker agrees with this diagnosis that Greene does 
not land on the first horn. Berker (2009) writes: 
Before turning to Greene’s and Singer’s central argument against the 
probative force of deontological intuitions, though, I want to briefly 
discuss three bad arguments for that conclusion. On a charitable 
interpretation of Greene and Singer, these are arguments that they don’t 
actually make but which it is extremely tempting to see them as making; 
on an uncharitable interpretation of Greene and Singer, these are bad 
arguments that they sloppily mix in with their main argument. My 
guess is that the truth lies somewhere in between: although Greene’s and 
Singer’s primary and most promising line of argumentation does not rely 
on these three arguments, I think they occasionally give their main 
argument more rhetorical force by invoking versions of these 
arguments. So it is worth showing just how unconvincing these three 
arguments are before we consider Singer’s and Greene’s main reason for 
thinking that Greene et al.’s neuroscientific research gives us good reason 
to privilege our characteristically consequentialist intuitions over our 
characteristically deontological ones. (pp. 315-316, emphasis mine) 
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Even on the uncharitable interpretation, these arguments are different than the 
main argument. On the charitable interpretation, Greene does not make any of 
the above arguments, and it is merely a temptation (of argumentative opponents) 
to read these arguments into Greene. To be clear, I do not think that Greene 
makes these arguments, and I think that Berker is tempted here. When he says 
that they invoke these arguments for rhetorical force, he also fails to provide any 
relevant citations to Greene.73 To be fair, I think that there are some arguments in 
the neighborhood, but these arguments are not deductions as Berker presents 
them. Rather, they are abductive arguments within a particular normative 
context that are meant to lend credence to normative conclusions. For example, 
consider Evolutionary History. There is an abductive argument in the 
neighborhood for not using judgments evolutionarily attuned to a different 
social environment to solve the problem of, say, anthropogenic climate change. I 
do not have the space to fully fill out this thought, but I trust the reader can fill it 
in for themselves. 
 So if we ought not interpret Greene as making the invalid arguments, all 
that is left of them is complaints that particular premises are undersupported or 
tendentious or that other moral philosophers disagree with some premise or 
needed bridging principle. But these are not logical errors or matters of shoddy 
inference. These are matters of substantive debate. So, in the end, there isn’t 
really a first horn in this dilemma, at least so stated. 
                                                             
73 Although he does cite Singer at one point. I agree that Singer is doing 
something other than what Greene is doing, argumentatively. But this is outside 
the scope of this paper.  
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4.3 Evaluating the Second Horn 
 
 Again, the second horn says that attempts to derive normative 
implications from the neuroscientific data rely on substantive normative 
assumptions that render the neuroscience normatively insignificant. Here is the 
argument that Berker (2009) attributes to Greene: 
THE ARGUMENT FROM MORALLY IRRELEVANT FACTORS 
P1. The emotional processing that gives rise to deontological intuitions 
responds to factors that make a dilemma personal rather than impersonal. 
P2. The factors that make a dilemma personal rather than impersonal are 
morally irrelevant. 
C1. So, the emotional processing that gives rise to deontological intuitions 
responds to factors that are morally irrelevant. 
C2. So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, do not 
have any genuine normative force. (p. 321) 
It is worth noting at the start that Greene (2010) more-or-less accepts this 
characterization of his view. So the only interesting question is whether Berker 
has reasons sufficient to reject this argument. 
 Berker offers three different “worries” about this argument. The first 
worry is that P1 might be false. The initial characterization of the “personal” / 
“impersonal” distinction does not neatly track the “gives-rise-to-
characteristically-deontological” / “gives-rise-to-characteristically-
consequentialist” judgment distinction. The ME HURT YOU criterion seems to 
fall prey to Kamm’s Lazy Susan Variant: 
LAZY SUSAN VARIANT: 
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A runaway trolley is heading toward five innocent people who are seated 
on a giant lazy Susan. The only way to save the five people is to push the 
lazy Susan so that it swings the five out of the way; however, doing so will 
cause the lazy Susan to ram into an innocent bystander. Is it appropriate 
for you to push the lazy Susan so that the five people swing out of the 
way? 
 
As Berker (2009) says: 
Kamm’s intuition about this case is characteristically consequentialist: she 
thinks it is permissible to push the lazy Susan, thereby killing the one to 
save the five. However, in doing so one would initiate a new threat (me) 
that causes serious bodily harm (hurt) to a person (you), so this case 
counts as a personal dilemma according to Greene et al.’s criteria. (p. 311) 
This is meant to show that the Argument from Morally Irrelevant Factors cannot 
go through as stated. We have a dissociation between the emotional processing 
and the property that it is purported to respond to.  
 This particular worry, though, doesn’t seem to have much force. Or, at 
least, it is not going to have much force against any empiricist moral 
psychologists who is already metaphilosophically committed to methodological 
naturalism and who is an experimentalist. One way to respond is to say that this 
is an invitation for further refinement of the target property. This is how science 
operates, and there is nothing especially troubling here.  
 The second “worry” is closely related to the first, so I bring it up now so 
that I can address Worry 1 and Worry 2 with the same evidence. I quote the 
Worry 2 in full: 
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Even if we were able to find a way of characterizing the factors which 
deontological judgments are responding to that makes P1 true, it is far 
from clear that P2 would still seem plausible. It is one thing to claim that a 
faculty which responds to how “up close and personal” a violation is 
responding to morally irrelevant features, but quite another thing to claim 
that a faculty which responds to whatever the sorts of features are that 
distinguish the footbridge case from the trolley driver case is responding 
to morally irrelevant features. Once we fix on what those features are, P2 
may well strike us as false. (Berker 2009, p. 324) 
This worry responds to my reply to the first worry. This says that even if we 
suitably refine P1 so that it comes out true, P2 may be false. There exist 
whichever sort of features distinguish Switch from Footbridge. But some of those 
features may not seem morally irrelevant on reflection. 
 The reply here is two-fold: first, this reply essentially admits that “up close 
and personal” as a criterion is easier to dismiss as morally irrelevant than other 
features. That is, it is tacitly assumed by this reply that “personalness” is either 
not really morally relevant in the moral-harm domain or that it is easier (relative 
to unnamed alternatives) to dismiss personalness as morally irrelevant. This is a 
major (but in my view sensible) concession to Greene, although there are some 
moral philosophers who would want to insist that it’s morally relevant.74 
                                                             
74 I thank Justin Bernstein and Samuel Freeman for forcing me to clarify this point. 
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 The second reply is that this worry is a lot like the first: there could be 
confounds. So the reply is a lot like the first: if you think that there are confounds 
or that there could be confounds, then run some more experiments isolating 
whatever you think has been blurred or shielded! Greene actually ran some more 
experiments and found that people were much more likely to say “Yes” to 
variants of Footbridge that involved a pushing a switch to release a trap door 
(either up close or remotely) than to variants that involved directly pushing the 
person (either with hands or with a pole).75 This puts additional, although not 
decisive, weight on the idea that a large number of people are preferentially 
responding to some property closely in the neighborhood of personalness.76 
 The final worry is that the argument is invalid. C2 does not follow from 
C1, unless we add a bridging premise that says that characteristically 
consequentialist judgments do not respond to morally irrelevant factors. More 
specifically, characteristically consequentialist judgments would have to be 
shown not to overlook morally relevant factors. But, as Berker correctly notes, that 
is exactly what non-consequentialist moral philosophers claim, and you can fill 
in the factor with your favorite example (separateness of persons, integrity, and 
so on).  
 Assume that this is true. Then, says Berker, the neuroscience is completely 
normatively insignificant. We are now arguing about which factors are morally 
relevant. In fact, Berker’s conclusion ought to be stronger than this, for 
                                                             
75 See (Greene 2010). 
76 Where that involves something resembling ME HURT YOU combine with, 
loosely, “touching.” 
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psychology itself should fall out of the picture. If the point is just that we are now 
in a normative argument about the relevance of factors in the world, then it 
doesn’t really matter, from such a pure moral perspective, how we are able to 
interact with those factors. All that matters is that those factors exists, some are 
relevant, and some aren’t. Neuroscience falls out of the picture, but so does 
psychology and any empirical domain. Berker doesn’t explicitly make this 
inference, but it is directly implied by his argument. 
 The reply is that if neuroscience is normatively insignificant, then so is 
psychology. But psychology is not. Therefore, neither is neuroscience. Unpacking 
this argument, let us note that it is accepted practice in most psychology 
departments and among most practicing psychologists that neuroscience can 
serve as some evidence for a psychological theory (although there is no 
particular need to ground every psychological theory in pure neuroscientific 
evidence). Greene is trying to use neuroscientific evidence to support the dual-
process theory. The dual-process theory predicts that there are some cases where 
the emotional, affective, quick system (call it System 1) will overgenerate and 
produce incorrect answers. Unless there is a special argument that the moral 
domain is unlike other domains – importantly, including other normative 
domains – then there is no special reason to think that neuroscientific evidence 
has nothing to say about the relevant moral psychology. 
 Berker has already admitted that the neuroscientific data for the dual-
process theory is impressive. If he admits that the dual-process theory is a 
85 
 
psychological theory and that neuroscience supports it, then he must be 
committed to the claim that psychology is a red herring.  
 However, psychology is not a red herring. Greene (2014) offers a way to 
think about this. If you can combine a minimal normative claim with a 
descriptive claim to generate a more powerful normative conclusion, then your 
mixed argument is not question-begging or problematic.77 Greene offers an 
example: suppose you want to know whether juries in capital cases make unfair 
decisions. Start with the minimal moral assumption that race is an irrelevant 
factor for decision. Add the psychological premise that jurors decisions are 
affected by the race of the defendant. You generate the stronger normative 
conclusion that juries in capital cases make unfair decisions.  
 Perhaps Berker would want to respond here that “all the work” is being 
done by the normative premise.78 But this cannot be correct. You cannot generate 
the conclusion without the descriptive premise any more than you can generate 
it without the normative premise. It is special pleading to deny this point. Of 
course, one could try to refine this point by saying that “all the normative work” 
is done by the normative premise.79 But I am not sure what is added. If the point 
is that you cannot get an “ought” merely from an “is,” then the reply is that 
Greene was never trying to do that. If the point is you need normativity to get 
normativity, then everyone agrees to that. If the point is that neuroscience is 
                                                             
77 See also (Kumar & Campbell 2010). 
78 I thank Pierce Randal and Samuel Freeman for this point. 
79 I thank Justin Bernstein for this point. 
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wholly normatively insignificant, then one should specify the sense of 
“normative significance” such that the point is interesting. 
 To summarize: Berker’s arguments against Greene either mischaracterize 
Greene’s point or rely themselves on strong normative assumptions that we have 
reason to reject. Both horns of the dilemma amount to the same claim: either the 
argument is invalid or neuroscience would be wholly irrelevant. The obviously 
invalid arguments should not be attributed to Greene. The case that neuroscience 
is normatively insignificant is either false, special pleading, or lacks concrete 
sense.  
5 Greene’s Move to Moral Theory 
 
That said, I do believe that Berker’s Dilemma applies to Greene! But the 
question now is to locate the normative insignificance of neuroscience. 
Remember my claim that if neuroscience is irrelevant, then so is psychology. 
What we need to find is a juncture in Greene’s argument where the psychology 
(and hence the neuroscience) is normatively insignificant. I do not believe that 
you find this in the earlier work. However, I do believe that you find it in Moral 
Tribes. There, Green is trying to use his prior work (as well as the work of others) 
to support a global moral theory. The main argument of the book is that we 
should all accept classical utilitarianism as the decision procedure for resolving 
interpersonal and intrapersonal moral conflict because moral psychology 
uniquely selects classical utilitarianism as the only method for resolving such 
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disagreement. Because the purpose of universal morality is to resolve such 
disagreement, classical utilitarianism is the one true universal morality. 
 Greene (2013) says that there are two fundamental moral problems80: first, 
the Tragedy of the Commons, and, second, the Tragedy of Commonsense 
Morality (pp. 14-15). “Morality” is the solution to the first tragedy, and 
“metamorality” is the solution to the second. I will discuss each in turn. 
 The Tragedy of the Commons is familiar from Garret Hardin’s (1968) 
work and from social science. We describe as situation as being a Tragedy of the 
Commons when there is a social problem of cooperation created by a 
misalignment of narrowly conceived self-interest and collective interest. In short, 
everyone benefits if everyone cooperates, but everyone has an individual 
incentive to defect from cooperation to maximize their expected utility. 
According to Greene, this is the moral problem of selfishness, or Me and Us (2013, 
p. 21). 
 Fortunately, says Greene, Mother Nature has lent us a helping hand in the 
form of morality. He says: “Morality is a set of psychological adaptations that 
allow otherwise selfish individuals to reap the benefits of cooperation (2013, p. 
23). Given this definition, it is not surprising to see Greene (2013)vwrite 
sentences such as “Morality evolved to enable cooperation” (p. 23). To many 
                                                             
80 Interestingly, it seems like the right way to interpret Greene is that these are 
moral tragedies because each particular problem has an impact on human well-
being. This will be important for my later argument that Greene is building his 
moral philosophy into his moral psychology in order to vindicate his moral 
philosophy, in a viciously and non-virtuously circular manner. 
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working in the humanistic tradition, this is a misunderstanding of what morality 
is. But, setting aside that point for now, we can see that Green offers an 
evolutionary functionalist account of morality. There is a specific problem of 
selfishness in a group, and our brains evolved over time to have a capacity for a 
limited form of altruism – in particular, reciprocal altruism with in-group 
members (Greene 2013, pp. 23-25).  
 However, according to Greene, there is the second tragedy, the Tragedy of 
Commonsense Morality. Greene hypothesizes that different groups have 
different moralities. These moralities regulate in-group individual selfishness by 
disposing people to act in a manner consistent with reciprocal altruism. But 
groups come into contact with one another, they have different moralities,81 they 
come into conflict, and that conflict affects human well-being. Morality, then, 
solves the problem of the Tragedy of the Commons but creates the problem of 
the Tragedy of Commonsense Morality. So what we need instead is a 
metamorality, “a moral system that can resolve disagreements among groups 
with different ideals, just as ordinary, first-order morality resolves disagreements 
among individuals with different selfish interests” (Greene, p. 26). 
 I will discuss later in the diagnosis section of my paper how exactly the 
moral psychology – in particular the dual-process theory – is supposed to factor 
into this explanation. But for now notice that morality is an adaptation and 
                                                             
81 It’s always been unclear to me whether these are different moralities or different 
prescriptions from the same morality.  
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Greene suggests that it is perhaps fairly modular in nature.82 Metamorality, on the 
other hand, is meant to rely upon some executive functioning and domain-
general reasoning ability (aka, rely on System 2).  
 According to Greene, morality and metamorality both help to resolve 
particular problems. The Tragedy of the Commons, one might reasonably 
suppose, in endogenous to the human condition. The Tragedy of Commonsense 
Morality, on the other hand, is an acute problem for people in a modern age, 
Greene suggests. While he allows that many problems associated with the 
Tragedy of Commonsense Morality have been solved by technical and legal 
solutions, Greene (2013) highlights remaining problem of conflicting local 
moralities: global poverty, violent conflict, terrorism, and global warming / 
environmental degradation (p. 98). These are “moral conflicts” because groups 
with different local moralities have either different moral values or different 
orderings of the same moral values. However, note that each Tragedy concerns 
issues that impact human well-being and that require cooperative solution: 
Morality is nature’s solution to the problem of cooperation within groups, 
enabling individuals with competing interests to live together and 
prosper. What we in the modern world need, then, is something like 
morality but one level up. We need a kind of thinking that enables groups 
with conflicting moralities to live together and prosper. In other words, we 
need a metamorality. We need a moral system that can resolve 
                                                             
82 In the psychological language, morality is largely a product of System 1 
processing. 
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disagreements among groups with different moral ideals, just as ordinary, 
first-order morality resolves disagreements among individuals with 
different selfish interests. (Greene 2013, p. 26)  
 However, it is not the case that any normative theory could qualify as a 
metamorality. Rather, only normative theories that could in principle resolve the 
Tragedy of Commonsense Morality can qualify as candidates for metamorality. 
This restriction disallows certain sorts of normative relativist positions, such as 
Gilbert Harman’s conventionalist ethic.83 Other relativist positions – such as a 
constructivism that claims that all humans, really, have the same interests or 
moral views – could in principle be allowed but would be ruled out on the 
grounds that it’s not true that all humans have the same interests or moral 
views.84 But the main normative theories that will be candidates for metamorality 
are those that tend toward anti-relativism and universalism. In short, the 
normative theories should have the conceptual resources to diagnose and resolve 
disputes between competing local moralities.  
 Note that this still leaves everything quite indeterminate. There are, in 
principle, many normative theories that have the conceptual resources to 
diagnose and resolve disputes between competing local moralities. Here Greene 
introduces what I take to be the most important restriction in all of his work, a 
restriction that ends up, according to him, leaving only one candidate for an 
acceptable metamorality. I turn now to this restriction, in order to later discuss 
                                                             
83 See (Harman 1975). 
84 At least at a level of grain that allows for the possibility of the Tragedy of 
Commonsense Morality. 
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how the combination of the restriction and the findings of moral psychology are 
meant to secure classical utilitarianism as the correct metamorality. 
6 Possession Argument 
 
 One argument that Greene uses extensively is what I will call the 
Possession Argument. This argument is not fully articulated but is frequently 
assumed in order for him to get to his requisite conclusion. What follows is a 
rational reconstruction of his view. 
According to the Possession Argument (PA), an acceptable global 
morality system must satisfy two desiderata:  
(D1) humans with basically normal psychologies must be able to 
comprehend what the system asks of them for each action-choice,  
and  
(D2) humans with basically normal psychologies must care about or value 
that which the morality system requires that they care about or value. 
I bundle the cognitive and motivational components together as possession:  
(PN1) humans must possess the psychological resources necessary to 
comprehend and value what the morality system requires,  
and  
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(PN2) any morality system that individuals can’t comprehend or care 
about properly or both is not an acceptable candidate for a global morality 
system.  
According to Greene, deep pragmatism (or classical utilitarianism) is the only 
morality system that satisfies possession, and, thus, deep pragmatism is the 
correct global morality system. PA is an argument from elimination. 
 But what is the argument from elimination that deep pragmatism is the 
correct metamorality? There are two ways to tighten the solution space: first, we 
examine existing proposals for a decision procedure that would resolve the 
outstanding conflict and stipulate that those are the only proposals. In 
contemporary Anglophone normative ethics, the three primary candidates are 
virtue ethics, Kantian deontology, and utilitarianism. Second, we demand that 
the candidates encapsulate values that are shared by all because it’s within the 
context of a shared value that conflicts can be resolved by appeals to empirical 
evidence. It’s partly because they don’t encapsulate share values that Greene 
concludes that virtue ethics and Kantian deontology are unsuitable candidates 
for metamorality.  
 Greene’s argument against virtue ethics is quite similar to his argument 
against deontology. Greene argues against virtue ethics as follows: 
(P1) Virtue ethics needs to appeal to the virtues to resolve conflicts. 
(P2) Different tribes have different virtues. 
93 
 
(P3) The different virtues of the different tribes conflict. 
(P4) There is no rule of priority among the virtues that settles conflict 
about the virtues. 
(P5) Such a rule is necessary for virtue ethics to act as a decision 
procedure. 
(C) \, Virtue ethics is not an appropriate metamorality. 
The argument against virtue ethics is similar to the argument against deontology. 
Greene’s argument is deliberately targeted at modern forms of deontology that 
stress a rights-based approach: 
(P1) Rights-talk consists of evidence-insensitive moral demands. 
(P2) Our automatic settings issue evidence-insensitive moral demands. 
(C1) \, Our automatic setting issue rights-talk. 
(P3) Relying on automatic settings creates or reinforces the tragedy of 
common-sense morality. 
(C2) \, Rights-talk creates or reinforces the conflict. 
(P4) That which creates or reinforces the conflict can’t resolve the conflict. 
(C3) \, Rights-talk can’t resolve the conflict. 
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What’s similar in these arguments is that they are both forms of the argument 
from disagreement.85 The argument against virtue ethics is explicit in this regard: 
different tribes extol different virtues, and these different virtues conflict. 
Because these conceptions of virtue are not universally shared across cultures, 
we should be skeptical of the idea that appeals to virtue can solve the tragedy of 
common-sense morality. In fact, the tragedy of common-sense morality is largely 
a bi-product of cultures with different valuations of different character traits 
violently disagreeing with one another. An example of this would be debates 
about gender roles in society: different local moralities ascribe different character 
properties to their normative ideal of, say, “woman.” The disagreements about 
the schema for ‘woman’ translate into intertribal conflict about how best to 
organize society with respect to women as well as which behaviors and attitudes 
are appropriate of and toward women. Disagreement about the schema for 
‘woman’ can’t be resolved by invoking a particular schema for ‘woman.’ 
 The argument against rights-oriented deontology is an implicit argument 
from disagreement. What’s important in the argument is that while it’s uniform 
that we all have automatic settings or processes, the outputs of these setting or 
outputs are not uniform and are strongly correlated with the particular local 
morality that we were raised in. According to the argument, automatic settings 
yield moral absolutes that are insensitive to evidence, and rights are a form of 
moral absolutes that are insensitive to evidence. Different local moralities 
disagree about what counts as a right. Some cultures believe that children have a 
                                                             
85 See (Mackie 1990). 
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right not to endure any form of corporal punishment. Other cultures believe that 
parents not only have a right but also have an obligation to corporally punish 
their children. Either side invoking its supposed “right” cannot resolve this 
disagreement. The argument says that, by definition, when people argue using 
the language of moral rights and rival disputants assert “P” and “Not P,” there is 
no evidence that could get either side to rationally concede. Automatic settings 
are automatic and, in this context, assumed to be inflexible. 
 In the next section, I will both discuss the positive argument that 
utilitarianism satisfies PA and present an objection side-by-side. The objection 
forces Greene into a dilemma that I will detail at the end of the section. 
7 The Modal Objection to the Possession Argument 
 
 Now, let’s point out the obvious problem with Greene’s conclusion that 
utilitarianism is the correct metamorality: it’s not clear that there is a sense of 
“can” such that utilitarianism satisfies PA while deontology and virtue ethics do 
not. Remember what PN2 tells us: 
(PN2) any morality system that individuals can’t comprehend or care 
about properly or both is not an acceptable candidate for a global morality 
system.  
Given what’s been said, we should expect that utilitarianism is the correct 
metamorality. But Green does not show that. Rather, he shows that utilitarianism 
may be the correct metamorality. Here is what I understand he proves – call it 
Utilitarian Metamorality: 
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P1. Utilitarianism is based on three ideas: experience is what matters, and 
everyone’s experience counts the same, and we should maximize good 
experiences and minimize bad experiences. 
 
P2. Everyone cares about experience. 
 
P3. Everyone can care about impartiality. 
 
P4. Everyone cares about maximizing good experiences. 
 
C1. \, Everyone can care about utilitarianism. 
 
P5. It’s possible to resolve the conflict by appealing to values shared by all. 
 
C2. \, Utilitarianism may resolve the conflict. 
 
Some commentary on this argument is clearly necessary. First, remember that 
this is an argument for utilitarianism as a decision procedure for resolving 
conflict between competing groups with different local moralities. Second, P2 
means that people care about experience because it’s experience, and not simply 
because it’s their experience. Some may find this premise objectionable, but I 
allow it for the sake of argument. Third, P5 is the optimistic interpretation about 
the likely effects of metamorality on metamoral problems. Fourth, if it weren’t 
already evident, I’m interpreting “cares” as “values,” in the sense that if we must 
appeals to values shared by all, we must appeal to what all care about. 
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 As you can likely tell, I think the action lies at P3 and how we should 
interpret it. But before that, we need to make sure Greene accepts P3. I think 
Greene accepts P3 because anything stronger than P3 would be both false and bad 
for his argument. For example,  
P3*. Everyone cares about impartiality. 
 
is clearly false, and besides being false, it’s being false is crucial for the tragedy of 
common-sense morality to get off the ground.86 Remember that both the tragedy 
of the commons and the tragedy of common-sense morality both represent a 
failure rooted in partiality. In the tragedy of the commons, the partiality is self-
directed, and in the tragedy of common-sense morality, the partiality is directed 
toward the group of which I am a member. However, if  
P3^. No one cares about impartiality. 
 
then utilitarianism violates P4.87 Moreover, if P3^, then utilitarianism fails to 
satisfy possession, and failing to satisfy possession is sufficient to eliminate a 
morality system from contention for metamorality.  
 Because P3^ would violate the possession requirement and because P3* is 
obviously false, the best that Greene can develop by way of argument is a modal 
                                                             
86 The same point applies, mutatis mutandis, to the maximizing element of 
utilitarianism. I have backgrounded the maximizing element for the sake of 
argument, but I could run the same argument, with suitable modification and 
reference to behavioral economics, on that element.   
87 Another note on P3^ is that it’s false because of a combination of Bishop Butler 
reasons and empirical facts. See (Butler 2006). 
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claim that people can care about morality. That is, the values encapsulated in 
utilitarianism, specifically the value of impartiality of ethical consideration, are 
open to humans with otherwise normal psychologies. 
 How are we to interpret “can?” I can come to like indiscriminate violence, 
in a certain sense of “can.” It’s a conceptual possibility. But in a practical or real-
world context, it may also be appropriate to say that I can’t. My character is such 
that there is no practical path by which I can come to like indiscriminate 
violence, given the set of attitudes and beliefs that I have. If “can” is interpreted 
in the first way, then I don’t see how that helps utilitarianism or counts in its 
favor. We are after neither merely conceptual nor bare metaphysical possibility. 
For if we were, then it’s surely true that it’s a conceptual possibility that people 
can come to share the same virtue characterization or adherence to the same well-
defined list of rights. But that implies that utilitarianism is no better off in this 
regard than virtue ethics and deontology, and so the argument fails to deliver the 
requisite conclusion. 
 But, in a “relative to an agent’s current psychological set” sense of “can,” 
then not everyone can care about impartiality.88 That is, given most people’s 
current attitudes and beliefs and given how ingrained and recalcitrant those 
attitudes and beliefs are, it is not true that there is a practical path by which 
people can come to care about impartiality. This is the well-documented case of 
loving relationships. There is a domain of justified partiality, most people feel, 
                                                             
88 Compare to Bernard William’s discussion of internal reasons in (Williams 
1981a). 
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and considerations of impartiality don’t full map out the justifications for acting 
on certain kinds of impartiality. Impartiality doesn’t make me save my wife when 
given the choice of saving my wife or saving a stranger, nor would invocations of 
impartiality serve to justify the choice to my wife or others. As Williams (1981b) 
would say, that’s “one thought too many,” and it represents a distorted 
philosophical idealization of the substance of our ethical lives to pretend 
otherwise. 
 So Greene owes us an account of “can” such that people can get 
utilitarianism but not deontology or virtue ethics. I hazard to guess that such a 
“can” does not exist.  
8 21st Century Psychology Cannot Save the Possession Argument 
 
 Greene attempts to pull the relevant “can” out of his moral psychology, in 
particular from his neuroscientific data. But, if you look at what he actually says, 
there is little support for the idea that people can care about that which 
utilitarianism requires that they care, in a sense of “can” that also eliminates 
deontology and virtue ethics from consideration. Instead, what we receive is a 
mish-mash of personal intuition, motivated appeals to spurious evidence, and 
hand waving. But, if you do not know enough about the relevant neuroscience 
and about philosophical moral theory, then it is easy to miss both where the 
argument goes wrong and why someone as smart as Greene would put forward 
arguments that are clearly bad.  
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 Let’s start with evidence that Greene attempts to answer to Modal 
Objection by appealing to the brain. Greene attempts to sidestep the existence of 
moral truth by focusing instead on the epistemology rather than the 
metaphysics. He writes: 
Once upon a time, I thought that this (TN: does moral truth exist?) was the 
question, but I’ve since changed my mind. What really matters is whether 
we have direct, reliable, non-question-begging access to the moral truth – 
a clear path through the morass – not whether moral truth exists. For the 
reasons given above, I’m confident we don’t have this kind of access. (If 
there are authoritative ways to resolve moral disagreements that don’t 
rely on divine revelation, pure reasoning, or empirical investigation, I’ve 
not heard of them.) Once we’ve resigned ourselves to working with the 
morass, the question of moral truth loses its practical importance. . . . 
Resigned to the morass, we’ve no choice but to capitalize on the values we 
share and seek our common currency there. (Greene 2013, pp. 188-189) 
Here it is clear that Greene is searching for shared values because he believes that 
we do not have reliable epistemic access to the moral truth, on the hypothesis 
that the moral truth exists. That is, regardless of whether the moral truth exists, 
we still face the problems caused by the Tragedy of Commonsense Morality, and, 
hence, we still have a need for a metamoral solution. The metaphor of “common 
currency” relied upon the idea that we can translate our moral concerns 
(anchored in different values that are not shared) into some shared value or set of 
shared values that allow for explicit comparison of different choice options. This 
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means that, under a shared value, deliberations about what we ought to do will 
largely come down to figuring out what the empirical and non-moral facts are 
like.  
 If we remember the arguments against rights-based deontology and virtue 
ethics, then we remember that the problem with each is that the relevant values 
are not shared, or not shared widely enough. So, for example, different tribes 
extol different rights or different virtues. You can’t appeal to one of those rights 
or virtues in order to decide which right or virtue ought to be endorsed. You 
need something else instead, some other value. Greene says that the shared 
values concern experience, impartiality, and maximization. We all care (or can 
care) about experience as experience. We all care (or can care) about impartiality. 
We all care (or can care) about maximization. Combine the three, and you have 
utilitarianism. 
 The evidence that these values are shared is supposed to come from 
science itself. So, while science cannot tell us what the moral truths are, says 
Greene, science can say which values are shared (and why) and which not (and 
why). So consider: 
I do not claim, however, that utilitarianism is the moral truth. Nor do I 
claim, more specifically, and as some readers might expect me to, that 
science proves that utilitarianism is the moral truth. Instead, I claim that 
utilitarianism becomes uniquely attractive once our moral thinking has 
been objectively improved by a scientific understanding of morality. 
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(Whether this makes it the “moral truth” I leave as an open question.) 
Although we may not be able to establish utilitarianism as the moral truth, 
I believe that we can nevertheless use twenty-first-century science to 
vindicate nineteenth-century moral philosophy against its twentieth-
century critics. (Greene 2013, p. 189) 
I claim that Greene thinks that utilitarianism will be uniquely attractive because, 
if the explanation works, only utilitarianism satisfies PA. And he explicitly 
claims that science can show whether a particular candidate for metamorality 
satisfies PA. If science can show that only one candidate can satisfy PA, then 
science can “vindicate” utilitarianism in the sense that, if we agree that the 
Tragedy of Commonsense Morality is something to be avoided, then, given 
unique satisfaction of PA, we should avert to utilitarianism to solve problems 
related to the environment, global poverty, terrorism and the like.  
 So what is the scientific evidence that vindicates utilitarianism? 
Surprisingly, there does not exist scientific evidence that people care about 
experience as experience, care about impartiality, and care about maximizing 
good experience as such. Or, if such evidence exists, Greene does not provide it.  
 For the sake of argument, I accept Greene’s argument that System 2 is a 
maximizing system. That is, for any value backgrounded by the system, the 
system will try to maximize that value. The work of Kahneman and Tversky, 
especially Prospect Theory, attempts to explain satisficing and loss aversion as 
primarily a function of System 1, such that a maximizing System 2 could, in 
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principle (or at least for some people), override the aversion.89 Maximizing per se 
is not the target. 
 Moreover, I will not, in this paper, argue extensively against the idea that 
people care about experience as experience. Greene does not offer psychological 
or neuroscientific evidence that people value experience as experience. By 
“experience as experience,” I mean experience as such. This is the familiar idea 
from the classical utilitarian tradition that no one’s experience counts for any 
more than anyone else’s experience and that my current experience does not 
count for more than my later experience simply in virtue of happening now.90 
Greene deploys traditional philosophical argumentation and intuition-pumping 
in order to secure this consideration. So, for example, he rehearses a familiar 
Aristotelian regress argument meant to show that asking “why care about that?” 
in relation to happiness has a quizzical or nonsensical air. But intuitions vary on 
this point, and plenty of people do not think the question so quizzical. 
Ultimately, Greene balks at extending the regress argument to secure the 
conclusion that all that really has value is happiness – he remains content with 
the idea that many chains do in end happiness. I am willing to spot him this 
conclusion. 
 Greene also does not offer psychological or neuroscientific evidence that 
people value impartiality, and I am not willing to spot him the conclusion that 
people care about impartiality. Nor am I willing to spot him the conclusion that 
                                                             
89 See (Kahneman 2011). 
90 See (Sidgwick 1981). 
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people can care about impartiality, with some interpretation of “can” such that 
people cannot come to value what’s required by deontology or virtue ethics. 
Again, there are two components here: people must have the conceptual 
resources to understand what impartiality is, and people must have the 
motivational resources to care about impartiality, in the sense of being able to act 
from direct impartial concern.  
 Greene goes through standard evidence that shows that most human 
beings are partialist and that their sympathies and altruistic concerns for others 
are limited in various ways. This includes evidence concerning kin altruism, 
direct reciprocal altruism, and indirect reciprocal altruism.91 Limited altruism is a 
primary driver of the Tragedy of Commonsense Morality. So what Greene needs 
is some way to escape parochial altruism – some metamorality, the components 
of which people are able to possess.  
 Grant that System 2 is a maximizing system that seeks to produce optimal 
consequences. A good question to ask, as Greene (2013) himself notes, is 
“Optimal for whom” (p. 199)? 
Note that you simply cannot appeal to System 2 itself to answer this 
question, as one who does not know much about cognitive psychology, 
behavioral economics, or neuroscience may want to do. Maximizing per se does 
not answer the question, and “for whom?” is an input into the system, rather 
than a weight of the system that operates on inputs to produce outputs. System 2 
                                                             
91 For a more detailed discussion, see (Wilson, E. O., & Hölldobler, B. 2005).  
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is a general-purpose action planner that “is, by necessity, a very complex device 
that thinks not only in terms of consequences but also in terms of the trade-offs 
involved in choosing one action over another, based on their expected 
consequences, including side effects” (Greene 2013, p. 199)92 However, we can 
(and do, as a matter of fact) treat deontological and virtue ethical considerations 
as goals (as potential end-state consequences), and we can have trade-offs 
between competing considerations. For example, we may want to produce a state 
of affairs where we act as the virtuous person would act. Accept for the sake of 
argument that there are multiple virtues and that the virtues are distinct and 
non-identical. Accept for the sake of argument that the virtuous person is the 
person with virtues V1, V2, . . ., Vn.93 We may have alternative actions {A1, A2, . . 
., An} to choose from. Some virtues will call for certain actions, other virtues for 
other actions. But there exists some determinate action that is the action that the 
virtuous person would do. Among that set of alternative actions is the action that 
the virtuous person would do, and presumably that action would involve 
choosing one action over others, based (at least in part) on a consideration of 
expected consequences, including side effects. The virtuous person could decide 
to act partially or to discount the considerations of at least some others in the 
causal wake of the action. All this is consistent with the characterization of 
System 2. So we need additional material to get to impartiality, for it is consistent 
with System 2 that it produces an ethical output that does not yield the relevant 
partiality.  
                                                             
92 Moral Tribes, 199. 
93 See (Hursthouse 1996).  
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 Greene offers two ways to get to impartiality, but neither has much to do 
with relevant psychological or neuroscientific research. The first concerns selfish 
individual actors deciding how to split a pot. Say that there are ten actors and 
one-thousand coins. No actor has a threat advantage over any other actor. How 
to split? The solution, says Greene, is an equal split, for there are no power 
asymmetries that could give rise to a motive to defect from equal split. The 
solution is “stable,” in the sense that no individual actor has an incentive to 
defect from equal splitting. 
 But notice that this is just game-theoretic analysis and has nothing in 
particular to do with how actual human beings make their decisions. Of course, 
if people were trying to maximize their own well-being and if there were no 
power asymmetries, then people would have the conceptual and motivational 
resources necessary for them to “get” impartiality. But we already know that 
people and the world are not like that: people are not merely selfish (the 
evidence of limited altruism proves that) and power asymmetries have always 
existed (anthropology, history and political awareness proves that). How do 
creatures like us who live in conditions such as ours come to “get” impartiality? 
 Greene tries another to get to impartiality in another way by drawing on 
one of the central ideas of Peter Singer’s The Expanding Circle (1981). Greene starts 
this time with human agents who are predominantly egoist.94 People care for 
themselves, for their families, for the friends, and for relevant in-group members. 
                                                             
94 A much more faithful model for actual human agents. 
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I quote to show that there is no relevant psychological or neuroscientific data 
that backs up the move: 
People, for the most part, don’t care very much about complete strangers. 
But at the same time, people may come to appreciate the following fact: 
Other people are, more or less, just like them. They, too, care most of all 
about themselves, their family members, their friends, and so on. 
Eventually, people may make a cognitive leap, or a set of cognitive leaps, 
culminating in a thought like this: “To me, I’m special. But other people 
see themselves as special just as I do. Therefore, I’m not really special, 
because even if I’m special, I’m not especially special. There is nothing 
that makes my interests objectively more important that the interests of 
others.” (Greene 2013, p. 200, emphasis mine.) 
This is a hand-waving explanation of a crucial component of utilitarianism. 
Remember that science was supposed to help pick out utilitarianism as a 
particular attractive metamorality. But, when we get to the important part of 
people “getting” all the components of utilitarianism, science exits, and magic 
comes in.  
 The first leap comes when people appreciate that others care about the 
things that they themselves care about. Even here, we have it that people may 
come to appreciate this fact. Of course, they may not. This is merely to throw us 
back again on the problem of the Modal Objection. What is the sense of “may 
come” such that people will not and cannot come to appreciate that which 
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deontology or virtue ethics requires that they appreciate? Second, there is no 
compelling scientific evidence that I am aware that suggests that most people do 
in fact appreciate that fact or that they may come to. What we have here is either 
some sort of optimism in people (which would be surprising given some of the 
things that Greene has said about the folk in other parts of Moral Tribes), or some 
sort of importing of moral content into the psychological explanation. That is, 
Greene needs it to be the case that people can cognitively and motivationally get 
the idea of impartiality. But he should be committed to the idea that we can say 
that people can cognitively and motivationally get the idea of impartiality on the 
basis of reliable scientific evidence. This is psychological speculation of exactly 
the sort that Greene deplores humanists as engaging in. 
 The second leap (or series of leaps) comes when people move from the 
idea that everyone basically cares about the same things to the incredible ideas 
found in the imagined monologue at the end of the quote. People move from the 
first idea to “To me, I’m special” to “To each person, he/she/they are special” to 
concluding that “I’m special, but not especially special” to “there is nothing that 
makes my interests objectively more important that the interests of others.” 
There are a couple of striking things here.  
 First, again, people “may make” the additional series of leaps eventually. 
There is the already stated problem concerning “may make.” But “eventually” is 
another problem altogether. How much time are we allowed to grant for 
“eventually” to have purchase for utilitarianism but not for deontology and 
virtue ethics? Here, the relevant sense of “can” is not one relevant to choice at the 
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current moment. If we allow that people eventually may make such additional 
leaps, then why can we not allow that people may make such additional leaps as 
is required of the other theories? 
 Second, the whole line of thought is just one massive non-sequitur and is 
invalid at each step. If people reason in such a way, then this cannot possibly be 
rational evidence of utilitarianism or the component under consideration. I am 
inclined to think that if this is how people get to “get” impartiality, then we have 
a debunking argument against the idea of impartiality, based upon its improper 
etiology. Invalidly drawn conclusions may be true or false, but you need some 
other chain of reasoning or evidence to establish them as true or false. The story 
given should not affect your antecedent commitments. 
 Third, you cannot even get to impartiality from these considerations 
alone. The selfish nihilist can accept the conclusion of the reasoning but not 
accept impartiality. The nihilist is one who thinks that nothing is objectively 
more important than anything else. But that does not imply that the nihilist does 
not find some things more important. If selfish, then the nihilist privileges his 
interests over others while also holding that there is no objective basis for him to 
do so. The same is true, with appropriate modifications, for certain relativist and 
subjectivist views.  
 In fairness to Greene, he acknowledges this. However, the answer that he 
gives to this objection is unsatisfying: 
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But it seems that, somehow, we do manage to translate this intellectual 
insight into a preference, however weak, for genuine impartiality. I 
suspect that this translation has something to do with empathy, the ability 
to feel what others feel. Human empathy is fickle and limited, but our 
capacity for empathy may provide an emotional seed that, when watered 
by reasoning, flowers into the ideal of impartial morality. (2013, p. 201) 
This will not work, though. First, a “weak preference” for genuine impartiality is 
not enough. What is required is that people have an overriding preference for 
genuine impartiality in areas of metamoral concern. If people merely have a 
weak preference, then that preference will be trumped by other preferences in 
the relevant profiles. But that is just to say that people will not, in fact, be 
motivated to act on the idea of impartiality, which is just to say that 
utilitarianism fails to satisfy PA. Second, what does it mean to be “watered by 
reasoning?” The metaphor is inapt, for Greene holds that the relevant kind of 
reasoning is the sort of stuff that System 2 does. But we have already said that 
System 2 is a maximizing-relative-to-a-value system. There is no obvious or 
perhaps foreseeable path from “Maximize the pleasurable experiences of those to 
whom I have concern” to “Maximize the pleasurable experiences of all people.” 
That is exactly what is at stake. 
 Greene (2013) ultimately ends up admitting that he has no idea how the 
idea of impartiality came about in humans with the sorts of brains they have. 
But, he says, 
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I’m fairly confident of two things. First, the ideal of impartiality has taken 
hold in us (we who are in on this conversation) not as an overriding ideal 
but as one that we can appreciate. None of us lives perfectly by the 
Golden Rule, but we all at least “get” it. Second, I’m confident that the 
moral ideal of impartiality is a manual-mode phenomenon. This ideal 
almost certainly has origins in automatic settings, in feelings of concern 
for others, but our moral emotions are themselves nowhere near impartial. 
Only a creature with a manual mode can grasp the ideal of impartiality. 
(p. 201) 
Note that this is only a possible explanation of the cognitive grasp of 
impartiality, not the motivational grasp. An overriding ideal, on this construal, 
would be one that would motivate us at each choice-point. But we are not so 
motivated. Rather, we “get” impartiality. I see no way to read this passage that 
says anything above that we have the conceptual tools to understand what 
impartiality requires of us. Notice again that there is no psychological or 
neuroscientific evidence that is brought to bear on this question. Rather, there is 
Greene’s confidence that anyone who has to capacity to ask the metamoral 
question has the conceptual resources to understand impartiality. This 
confidence is less than the advertised standard of proof Greene offered before. 
Moreover, there is again the idea that impartiality (or genuine impartiality, 
extending to all) comes about from System 2 operations. But given everything 
said about System 2 above, we have absolutely no reason to accept that 
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characterization. Moreover, given everything that Greene has said about System 
2, it is completely unclear what the scientific evidential basis is for his confidence.  
 We still have the lingering motivational component. Greene offers an 
unclear analogy to explain the motivational component. There is a difference 
between shopping for food while hungry and while full. We can be motivated to 
shop for food based entirely on automatic settings. But we can also be motivated 
to shop for food while completely full. Even though shopping while full will 
have something to do with your automatic settings, it does not fully rely on your 
automatic settings. Your manual settings can allow you to shop for things that 
you do not desire at all presently, on the basis that you can project into the future 
what you would like. You can also shop for other people’s food. If you relied 
merely on automatic settings, then you would just get the things you like. The 
moral, at the end of this confusing metaphor:  
Somehow, the human brain can take values that originate with automatic 
settings and translate them into motivational states that are susceptible to 
the influence of explicit reasoning and quantitative manipulations. We 
don’t know exactly how it works, but it clearly does. (Greene 2013, p. 202)  
Appeals to brute fact are surprising here. The whole point was that science was 
supposed to show why utilitarianism was particularly attractive as a 
metamorality. But how does this metaphor even work? We have problems 
dealing with individual selfishness. Limited altruism helps solve some of the 
problems associated with individual selfishness. But we also have problems of 
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group selfishness. So System 2 just hijacks the output of System 1 (limited 
altruistic concern) and translates that output into some kind of motivational state 
such that people either care about or can care about genuine or full impartiality. 
This is not a genuine scientific explanation. This is pounding on the table in order 
to continue to secure the conclusion that utilitarianism is the correct 
metamorality.  
 I conclude this section by underlining the fact that Greene has not 
established his case as he said he did. He said that science would show that 
utilitarianism is the most attractive candidate for metamorality by showing how 
utilitarianism satisfies PA. But, when we get to impartiality, Greene offers a 
mish-mash of motivated appeals to evidence, intuition-pumping, motivated 
appeals to brute facts, and so on. If we pay attention to how humans act and if 
we pay attention to relevant features of System 2, we see that there is no way that 
Greene was able to pull the rabbit out of the hat with the resources that he has. 
9 Conclusion 
 
 In this paper, I have diagnosed different problems with the moral 
psychology offered by Joshua Greene. I started with showing that the objection 
that most humanists take as decisive – Berker’s Dilemma – actually lacks force 
because it is involved in exactly the sort of game of smuggling normative content 
that it accuses Greene of and because it grants to Greene too many of the 
descriptive components for those normative complaints to have any upshot. 
Then I turned my attention to the particular normative claims that Greene wants 
114 
 
to make. I exposed how those normative claims turn on how we are to 
understand the Possession Argument: that human beings with otherwise normal 
psychologies must have the cognitive and motivational resources necessary to 
“get” what the particular candidate for metamorality says they must get. One 
way to understand this point is to grasp that any particular normative theory 
will bring with it some empirical or psychological commitments as well. If we 
can show that those empirical or psychological commitments cannot be cashed 
out satisfactorily, then we have provided at least some reason to reject the 
normative theory under consideration.  
 Greene thought that he could show that people can “get” utilitarianism 
but not “get” rights-based deontology or virtue ethics. What I have attempted to 
do is force Greene into a dilemma: 
(D1) Either people have the cognitive and motivational resources to “get” 
utilitarianism and also deontology and virtue-ethics, or 
(D2) People do not have the cognitive and motivational resources to get 
deontology and virtue ethics and also utilitarianism. 
My support for the dilemma came about by closely examining what sort of 
evidence that Greene provided to show that people “get” utilitarianism. I 
provided the Modal Argument to show that it cannot be the case for Greene that 
people, right now, in fact, “get” utilitarianism in the right way. If they did, then 
there would be no issue of metamorality. Instead, at best, people “can get” 
utilitarianism. We can revise the dilemma: 
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(D1*) Either people have the cognitive and motivational resources such 
that they can “get” utilitarianism and also deontology and virtue ethics, or 
(D2*) People do not have the cognitive and motivational resources such 
that they can “get” deontology and virtue ethics and also utilitarianism. 
But Greene still requires evidence that he can get out of the dilemma, that people 
can “get” utilitarianism but not potential metamoral rivals. I argued that he 
thinks that science will provide us with the relevant sense of “can.” There is 
something about the brain, he thinks, that makes utilitarianism quite attractive. 
 But when we looked at the evidence, we noticed that he admits that 
System 2 is a general-purpose maximizing-relative-to-a-value system. So there 
has to be some other way for people to come to cognitively and motivationally 
grasp utilitarianism. First, Greene offered a game-theoretic story involving pure 
egoists with equal threat advantage. This is a thought experiment and does not 
rise to the level of psychological evidence in the relevant way (we are after 
descriptive models, not normative models). Second, Greene appealed to Singer’s 
idea of the expanding circle. But Greene’s version of the reasoning behind the 
expansion is invalid and lends no rational weight to utilitarianism. Moreover, 
there is no explanation of the mechanism by which one comes to full impartiality 
from that reasoning, for the reasoning does not end in full impartiality (just that 
nothing objectively matters). Finally, we saw Green appeal in both the cognitive 
and motivational cases to brute facts, but he is not entitled to that appeal (and by 
his own evidential standards). 
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 I have made the kinds of arguments that I have made by appealing to a 
wide range of considerations, including game theory, social science, cognitive 
science and ethical theory. But the general thrust of my argument can be reduced 
to the following: Greene is an ardent utilitarian who would like others to also be 
utilitarians. From this, he engineers a moral psychology that is meant to show 
that utilitarianism is the most attractive candidate for universal morality. This 
kind of circularity is bad. 
 The arguments that I have provided have attempted to identify and 
eliminate excesses of moral content in Greene’s psychological explanation. I have 
attempted to draw from diverse evidence bases – importantly, including social 
science, cognitive science, and ethical theory – to show how Greene’s moral 
psychology is really in the service of his utilitarian ethic. The moral psychology 
itself, and the evidence offered for it, provides insufficient rational support for 
utilitarianism in the end. But, when we look at how Green ignores what he 
acknowledges to be the case about System 2 in order to secure claims about the 
possession of impartiality, we can see that moral content is infecting his 
psychological explanation. He knows that he needs a psychological explanation, 
but, in the end, we are not given one. We have appeals to intuition, to brute fact, 
and to features of System 2. But, given what we know of System 2 and what 
Greene admits, System 2 could never, by itself, transform limited altruism into 
full impartiality. That is what Greene needs for his arguments, so that is what he 
claims. 
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 The moral of this paper, then, is that we should be wary of those with a 
normative agenda who are also doing psychology. In particular, we should be 
wary of psychological explanations that are just so convenient for securing some 
determinate normative conclusion. The suspicion is that, when you examine the 
arguments and evidence concerning psychologies uniquely picking our 
normative theories, the normative theory has already been illicitly imported at 
some step. The importing need not take the form of putting some determinate 
moral principle in the head; rather, you can have the import of moral content 
into psychological explanation when the psychologist is offering a purportedly 
neutral psychological characterization that just so happens to have some particular 
normative upshot. When some moral psychologist or philosophers introduces 
some psychological mechanism or explanation just to secure a normative 
conclusion, you should nearly always reject the mechanism or explanation. But 
this requires some understanding of the relevant normative considerations, and 
normative theory, at play. 
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